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Near East & South Asia

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Jerusalem Merchants Describe Closure's Effects

93AA0060C Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 24 Apr 93
p 3

[Article by Susan Fu'ad Hammudah]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The owner of the (Nufutiyah) Pottery Stores said: Sales were better before the closure, inasmuch as the store's clientele is not limited to Jerusalemites. Also, we have high taxes in a climate of economic stagnation. Some merchants are absent, because the owners of several stores are from the West Bank. However, the problem is what will happen after the closure ends. What will the situation be? [passage omitted]

(Azihman) Yogurt and Spices Stores

The owner and his partner said: Business has dropped by about 70 percent due to the security cordon. The economic situation is bad. Another effect of the security cordon is that the store has outside commitments to companies which it cannot fulfill, because it cannot reach them. He added that the closure is a disaster for the Palestinian people on the political, subsistence, and national levels. The store owner asked: "By what right is a native Jerusalemite, who owns a store and carries an identity card, prohibited from entering his city, opening his store, and conducting his business?"

(Al-Masrarah) Bakery

Business has dropped by almost 80 percent, not just because of the closure, but also because of the closure of the street (al-Anbiya' al-Masrarah Street). In my opinion, the closure is an attempt to empty Jerusalem, and it might be a trial for self-rule. As for my feeling, it is the feeling of anyone who is Palestinian. [passage omitted]

The Abu-Ghazalah (Grocery) Stores

The cordon is not only a security cordon, but also a political cordon. Sales have dropped by 40 to 50 percent, because West Bank residents are no longer coming to Jerusalem as they did before the closure, when thousands of Arabs visited the Haram al-Sharif [Dome of the Rock Mosque] daily. We have had to adapt to the situation that has been imposed on us. One can tolerate it for a week or so, but after that, it becomes a loss.

Regarding the Schools in Jerusalem

Attendance was disrupted in the initial days, but then returned to normal with the closure's continuation, because students were able to enter Jerusalem. Also, the teachers obtained the necessary permits to enter their city and perform their jobs. However, the real problem posed by the closure to students is transportation. Students must make several connections to reach Jerusalem. This of course affects them psychologically, because they frequently arrive late, or nervous and tired, after having

to make more than one connection. Some colleges and universities have been closed because students have been unable to reach them.

The Opinion of a Music Professor Regarding the Closure

Despite the closure's effect, morale is good, because this is the beginning of the divorce between us and Israel, and the more we suffer, the more we reject this reality.

AL-FAJR Describes Tight Security at Orient House

93AA0060B Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 26 Apr 93
pp 11, 12

[Article by Muhammad ('Abdurabbih)]

[Text] The rumors about members of the Palestinian negotiating delegation receiving threats against their lives have apparently led to heightened security measures at Orient House. These measures have transformed its courtyards into something resembling a military barracks, and we sensed this in the nervous behavior of several guards. Anyone passing near Orient House is treated with suspicion and checked out.

Anyone entering or trying to penetrate the "populous" Orient House must wait a long time with the new guards. Some of these guards are former policemen put out of action by the intifadah, who, overnight, have been put back into action to guard Orient House and its residents, and have themselves been made residents of Orient House. They are implementing very strict security arrangements based directly on instructions from the current chief of the security apparatus at Orient House [Faruq Amin], who is a former police officer known for his competent handling of tasks assigned to him.

No one objects to these security arrangements. Everyone views them as a mode to which we must become accustomed. However, when these arrangements turn into rigid rules devoid of any humaneness or sociability, they take on the worst characteristics and warn of dangers, which we hope will not arise. Unfortunately, I was among the people who were subjected to these "security arrangements" two days ago when I went to the Orient House fortress to meet with Dr. Sa'ib 'Urayqat without a prior appointment in connection with my work with the newspaper.

I was initially taken aback by the "security arrangements" at Orient House. The guards were keen on carrying out their instructions in their entirety. They adhered to their instructions until a guard named Wa'il Nufal came on the line. I informed Wa'il Nufal—a former policeman from Bethlehem who has recently been employed in the guard patrols assigned to protect the guests at Orient House—of my task and the reason for my presence. After he contacted the relevant parties inside, pursuant to security arrangements, the answer was that I was to be refused entry, because I did not have

a prior appointment with Dr. 'Urayqat. I was surprised by the response. I informed the guard that my task was exceptionally urgent and did not require a prior appointment. However, he responded with rudeness unsuited to the reputation of where he was working. At that point, two guards entered. With effusive politeness and good manners, they apologized to me and opened the door to the "fortress." I entered into the external courtyard, waiting for a response from "inside" again, until an employee at Orient House, Rami Tahbub, who was most charming, came and asked me what I needed. I informed him of my wish to meet with Dr. 'Urayqat for five minutes or less in connection with my job as a journalist. Rami was absent for some time. He then returned. Without troubling himself to exit from the "fortress," he waved his hand from behind the window and informed the guard that Dr. 'Urayqat was very busy and could meet with no one. I asked him if this was his final answer. He said yes. I thanked him and left.

I left the gate of the "cabinet," watching the guards who were jammed into the courtyard. I remembered the "security instructions" circulated recently to guard squads requiring the reporting of any "suspicious object" outside or inside the Orient House headquarters. I looked at my shoes. I then asked myself, have we become "suspicious objects," which arouse doubt and suspicion?!

I left Orient House, wishing for Nufal, his counterparts, and his leaders, a bright future in the service of the homeland and the cause, in their capacity as its guards and protectors, and the vanguard of our future security apparatus in our emirate, which will exist sooner or later, imploring God not to make me like the people at Orient House and the court journalists there.

EEC Delegation Plans Environmental Health Projects

93AA0060D *Jerusalem AL-FAJR* in Arabic 24 Apr 93 p 2

[Text] Rafah, Gaza—The European Common Market [EEC] Ambassador in Palestine, (Thomas du Pla), accompanied by a European delegation, made a working visit to the municipality of Rafah the day before yesterday, where he met with Rafah Mayor 'Abd-al-Hadi Zahir and the town engineer's team to discuss cooperation with the EEC. An agreement was reached on implementing a number of environmental health projects. The most important of these projects is a comprehensive refuse project entailing the collection and transport of refuse to be fed into a sophisticated incinerator for disposal and treatment for recycling.

The municipality of Rafah submitted this project to the EEC two years ago.

An agreement was also reached on an exchange of know-how and visits, and on the training of technicians from the municipality of Rafah in municipalities of the EEC countries.

This will occur after a delegation of experts is sent to study the Rafah's needs.

In the evening of the same day, (Kerry Lisi), the European ambassador's assistant, met with a member of the Palestinian delegation, Dr. Jabar Fiddah; the secretary of the municipality of Rafah; the chairman of the Agricultural Cooperative Association; and a delegation from the Engineers Association. The purpose of the meeting was to study a sewers project for al-Shaburah Camp in Rafah and the provision of loans and aid to farmers through the Agricultural Cooperative Association in Rafah.

ALGERIA

Anti-Algerian Press Campaign in Morocco

93AF0599B *Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN* in French 25 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by F. B. Benmedjahed: "Hassan II Wants War?"]

[Text] In the past few days, the Moroccan press has launched a regular attack against Algeria, in particular against its reviving diplomacy. Its verbal violence and political objectives defy understanding. Worse, in some respects it sounds like a declaration of war between the two countries.

The excuse it used is the Sahraoui issue, which apparently scored a few diplomatic points on the international scene on the eve of the referendum organized under UN oversight. In the eyes of the king's penholders, these gains of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] are the work of Algeria, although all serious analysts agree that Algeria is doing all it can to find a peaceful issue to this problem, which has plagued the region since 1975.

Therefore, the daily L'OPINION (the Istiqlal party organ) of 23 April devoted its front page to what it called the "anti-Moroccan Algerian offensive" at the European Parliament plenary session of 19-23 April in Strasbourg. It said that, on the occasion of an Algerian art show, "the ambassadors of Algeria in Brussels and in Paris, Messrs. Abdelkader Taffar and Sid Ahmed Ghazali, and the Algerian consul in Strasbourg, Mr. Mahmoud Lemri, took this opportunity to tarnish Morocco's image and express again their support for the Polisario."

L'OPINION also claimed that this Algerian campaign started on "Tuesday, 20 April, at Sid Ahmed Ghazali's instigation, with the introduction of a resolution on human rights in Morocco." The Istiqlal organ also mentioned that on "Wednesday, 21 April, the ambassador, Mr. Taffar, attended the monthly meeting organized by Mrs. Barbara Simons, chairwoman of the 'Peace for Polisario' intergroup in Brussels."

In an intervention that L'OPINION said was "strongly worded," the Algerian ambassador "reiterated Algiers' unconditional support to the Polisario's cause, saying

that the European Parliament must use all its weight and exert maximum pressure to ensure that the referendum does not take place without the Polisario's agreement." The newspaper added that Mr. Taffar allegedly stated that Algeria is "against any settlement on paper."

L'OPINION treated Sid Ahmed Ghozali as if he were out to harness the issue for his own purposes. EL BAYANE, organ of the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism], which for some unknown reason is still labeled as communist, assumed a still more warlike tone. It wrote: "Peace in Maghreb concerns not just Morocco, the attacked country, and the Polisario, a military separatist organization, but also Algeria, the country which, out of self-interest, offers its hospitality to a separatist movement, and Mauritania, the country whose territory was often used as a base for aggression." Is the kingdom so afraid of the planned referendum that it will look for a warlike diversion or a military confrontation with its neighbors? The question is worth asking, so everyone will know the truth.

Listen again to EL BAYANE: "Morocco, all of its forces united, will never agree to turn part of the Mauritanian territory into a sanctuary under Polisario control. Zouerate will not replace Tindouf.... Our country, which never exerted its legitimate right of pursuit in Algerian territory will certainly become less accommodating and less patient after the referendum. After this referendum, the smallest incident or the least threat must be settled decisively and radically. Woo betide those who believe they will be safe behind borders.... Actually, some day this thorn will have to be removed for good and broken.... Given a chance, we bet that Morocco will not hesitate to do so." We shall spare you the editorial of EL ALEM, the other Arabic-language organ of the Istiqlal party, which, for its part, ventures to give Algeria lessons in diplomacy.

What does Algeria have to do with the Sahraoui issue, an issue that already became the responsibility of the United Nations a few years ago? It is one thing or the other: either the monarchistic regime fears the outcome of the referendum, or it is looking for a military diversion, first to save the throne, and second to achieve its old dream of territorial expansion into Algerian land. Morocco no doubt believes that now is the right time, as Algeria is entangled in its internal problems.

We understand better now the king's winks at the ex-FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] armed groups a few weeks ago, when he expressed his regret that the Algerian electoral experiment had been stopped. Facts now clearly suggest the existence of a foreign power's collusion with terrorist sects and the billionaires of corruption and drugs. Will Morocco's shaky royal regime be foolish enough to launch its poverty-stricken people into a military venture that will serve neither the ardently wished-for Maghreb union nor its peoples, the victims of the vultures' new world order that is getting established?

Possible Changes in CCN Makeup Proposed

93AF0574A Algiers LIBERTE in French 27 Apr 93 p 3

[Article by Idir Benyouunes: "CCN Will Be Expanded in June"]

[Text] *With the mandate of the HCE [Higher State Council] due to expire in just a few months, after which the transitional period will begin, the future of the CCN [National Advisory Council] is already causing many questions to arise.*

Since its establishment by the late President Mohamed Boudiaf, the National Advisory Council has been the focus of debates and discussions. Boudiaf intended it to take the leading roles in national political life. But after Mohamed Boudiaf died, the CCN was edged aside and even ignored by the government. The deadline of December 1993 makes the CCN the center of attention once again. The result is that a chapter is devoted to it on the agenda for dialogue between the HCE and the various groups concerned.

In the HCE's view, the CCN is an institution that cannot be ignored during the transitional period or even long before that period. The collegial leadership, which is to go to draw up a document synthesizing the dialogue, intends to submit that document to the CCN for further input before submitting it to a referendum. A well-informed source states that the referendum will definitely take place, because it is that referendum that will legitimize the transitional authorities.

Our source also says that the HCE is insistent that the referendum take place in order to avoid any suspicion of a possible maneuver by the five men to install puppets. The only specific problem that arises, however, is that of the security situation.

The outlines of the future CCN are beginning to be sketched out. The participants in the dialogue have mentioned two possibilities. The first is that everything concerning the CCN's human makeup will be done over from scratch, while the second is that its membership will simply be enlarged. A well-informed source says that overall, the criteria for eligibility to belong to the future CCN are known and definite. For example, future members must accept the principles included in the basic outline (democracy, pluralism, peaceful alternation in power, and the condemnation of terrorism). Moreover, candidates must possess a certain number of qualities: competence, integrity, honesty, and loyalty to the constant values of the nation and of November.

Representation on the future CCN will reportedly be ensured both horizontally (geographically) and vertically (politically). Some organizations such as the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy] have proposed that the members of the future CCN swear an oath before the Algerians. As far as its makeup is concerned, there is a desire to choose young members as far as that is possible without pushing aside "old-timers" who were not

involved in scandals or other kinds of poor management. Last, according to a well-informed source, enlargement of the CCN's membership is going to occur at the end of this coming June.

Numbers Living Below Poverty Line Increasing

*93AF0607A Algiers EL WATAN in French
28 Apr 93 p 12*

[Article by Katia Debbouz: "The Safety Net and All the Rest"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] In 1988, a survey by the National Bureau of Statistics found that 20 percent of the population accounted for 100 billion dinars [DA] in consumer spending, out of a total 207 billion DA. The poorest 20 percent, on the other hand, spent less than 25 billion DA.

The troubled economy and inflation running at several digits continue to widen the gap between the different segments of society.

The safety net initiated by the Ghozali cabinet was an attempt to attenuate the disparities between them.

Following a census, 14 million Algerians were declared "socially disadvantaged persons," a classification defined as those who earn less than 7,000 DA [per month] or have no income at all. The poorest segments of the population earn a monthly average of 6,500 DA a month. These were the groups for whom the protective measures of the social safety net were intended. Towards that end, the 1992 budget called for 9.5 billion DA to be disbursed in the form of assistance to low-income earners and 18.5 billion in price supports, as the government had ceased to subsidize the price of flour, bread, and milk.

But the social safety was found to be inadequate when an identification survey revealed that there were many more "disadvantaged persons."

The safety net was therefore extended to include widows and widowers with dependent children and an income of less than 7,000 DA. Also included were families in which the combined incomes of both spouses falls short of that amount.

Consequently, the budget allocations were found to be insufficient and a supplemental budget law called for 24.5 billion DA in "assistance to low-income earners" and 46.5 billion DA in "price supports."

It was announced at the time that the necessary funds would come from petroleum tax revenues, thanks to an increase in production.

In conjunction, the government announced a separate measure. In September, it agreed to the idea of a national solidarity fund based on a tax on net salaries and nonsalary income.

Naturally, the bulk of the fund's resources would come from high-level salaries and nonsalary income. But the idea of a national solidarity fund, like the idea of an "unemployment fund," has yet to be enacted.

The purpose of the "unemployment fund," which the labor federation has called for, would be to cushion the blow of personnel cutbacks, which everyone knows are inevitable.

Governmental assistance is not limited to supplemental income and price supports; it also addresses another aspect of social justice: housing. Near the end of last year, financial assistance for housing construction was included in the 1992 plan.

Specifically, the National Housing Fund (CNL) planned to build 25,000 new units midway between family-type housing for "midlevel" incomes and the type of housing characteristic of real estate development for the "higher incomes."

The CNL's assistance is intended for those who earn less than 12,000 DA. The beneficiaries have to assume only 10 percent of the cost of their housing. The rest is repayable over a 40-year period at a reduced rate of interest of 2.5 percent (as compared with 9 percent).

The CNL makes up the difference and the interest-rate reduction varies as a function of income.

For salaries of less than 5,000 DA, three parties are involved: the CNL, which assumes 20 percent of the cost of the unit; the home buyers, who pay 10 percent; and the CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank], which assumes 70 percent of the cost. The interest rate for this category is 2.5 percent.

For salaries between 5,000 and 7,500 DA, the interest rate is 3 percent; for salaries between 7,500 and 10,000 DA, the interest rate is 4 percent.

The fifth category includes those earning between 10,000 and 12,000 DA. It should be noted that the last four categories receive a reduced rate of interest, but do not receive direct aid.

However, like the national solidarity fund and the unemployment fund, the CNL has yet to announce the results of its activity, despite the fact that it has officially existed for more than one year.

Unemployment Figures; Situation Analyzed

93AF0574B Algiers LIBERTE in French 27 Apr 93 p 4

[Article by Ammar Boussalem: "Who Has the Miracle Solution?"]

[Text] Neither statistics nor the government can prove the contrary. The employment crisis—in other words, unemployment—is clearly demonstrated by a national economy that is in a slump.

The slump is so serious that the organizations responsible for managing the employment crisis do not know what to do next. The statistics, even while not revealing all the consequences of the painful problem of unemployment, are helping considerably to show the extent of this genuine social scourge. In its recent bulletin No. 162, entitled "Donnees Statistiques," the National Office of Statistics (ONS)—the reliability of whose work has often been proved—suggests that the number of unemployed was up by about 105,000 at the end of 1991. That is an 8.6-percent increase over 1990 and brings the total number of unemployed to 1,266,000! And that is 21 percent of the active population. The latest survey by the ONS also shows—and this is almost self-evident—that

the unemployment rate is highest among young people between 16 and 29 years of age: "The rapid rise in unemployment since 1986 is continuing in conjunction with the stagnation in the employment level," the ONS bulletin states.

In addition, according to the latest estimates by the Planning Council, the demand for jobs is now on the order of 230,000 jobs per year, but only 80,000 jobs were created in 1992. According to that central organization, unemployment affects nearly 22 percent of the active population, or 1,373,000 individuals, compared to 20.2 percent in 1991 and 19.2 percent in 1990. At the source of that economic and social stagnation is, quite obviously, the very marked slowdown in economic activity.

Changes in Labor Market, 1989-1992

Description	1989	1990	1991	1992
Applications received	247,235	229,825	161,300	170,710
Men	215,033	200,433	139,500	147,430
Women	32,202	29,392	21,800	23,280
Young people	122,834	120,720	80,960	78,610
Applications considered	97,312	78,783	54,900	44,815
Public sector	77,444	61,285	41,600	35,025
Private sector	19,868	17,498	13,300	9,790
Placements made	70,625	60,498	43,300	36,670
Permanent	45,023	33,055	20,400	14,750
Temporary	25,602	27,443	22,900	21,920

Source: Anem.

There is no work for the unemployed simply because investment spending by firms, purchases by the public sector, and exports are not sufficient to get the economic machinery moving again. Economic analysts emphasize generally that investments by firms play a fundamental role. In his work *Economie politique générale* (*General Economics*), published by Cujas Publishers in 1975, Jacques Lecaillon explains that expanded credit facilities, lower interest rates on loans, and reduced taxes on profits when the latter are reinvested are among the traditional means of combating recession and unemployment (pp. 168-169). But in the current situation, what can the authorities do reduce the unemployment phenomenon even marginally? The fact is that while the diagnosis has been definitely established, the problem is to find the proper horse medicine for curing this cancer at the source of the social deterioration we are experiencing. So far, neither the employment offices for young people, the directorates for the placement and advancement of young people, the central directorates for the promotion and regulation of employment, nor the National Employment Agency have succeeded in keeping up effectively with trends in the labor market. Does this mean that none of those agencies is fully playing the role assigned to it? The National Employment Agency (Anem), which, be it said in passing, does not create jobs (that is not its function), has no lack of

explanations: "we would like to have had a single agency so as not to dissipate potential requests for jobs," says Boussaidi Ali, director of information, studies, and documentation. Ali, who is aware even of the psychological state of the unemployed, feels that the Anem is currently encountering competition from the directorate for the placement and advancement of young people (DIPJ) in each governorate. Is this a matter of overlapping or conflicting prerogatives? Whatever the case, "the Anem, with its 60 local and regional offices, does not cover the entire national territory, and the result is that its field of activity is still too limited to permit it to really hear requests for employment."

There is a small dose of optimism, however: the Anem is able to place some 80 percent of all jobseekers despite the increasingly exacting demands of the firms. The agency points out that those placements are occurring in the public sector. The agency, which has a duty to "organize and ensure familiarity with the situation and developments as regards the national labor market and manpower," talks about an unemployment rate on the order of 20 percent, thus confirming the trend toward a more precarious job situation and, consequently, an increase in crime (idleness being the root of all evil).

In an economic bulletin dated January 1993, the Anem's Subdirectorate of Statistics provides revealing clues as to

the various profiles of jobseekers. By way of example, out of 46,967 applications received during the fourth quarter of 1992, about 57 percent of the registered jobseekers had no job skills at all or had had only a few months of on-the-job training in the firms, and 37 percent were supervisors or highly skilled workers, while only 4.84 percent were senior technicians or executives (levels 5 and 6). This means that nearly 50 percent of the jobseekers have only an elementary education—the level at which dropouts are a serious problem! (Every year, 270,000 pupils removed from the school system are added to the ranks of the unemployed.)

While unemployment is, by definition, a terrible waste of productive resources, this country's decisionmakers are continuing to put forward in their speeches the idea that an economic recovery is occurring in vital sectors. Actually, the situation is just the opposite: the big employers in BTPH [Construction, Public Works, and Housing], textiles, and agriculture are experiencing permanent crisis.

To take only the first of those key sectors, there is talk today of some 800,000 jobs being suspended in connection with the reorganization of public and private firms. The other dimension of the problem concerns the inadequacy of the job training system and the vocational training system's blatant inability to handle its load. That being the case, how can we restore hope to those hundreds of thousands of idle people when trained young apprentices have no guarantee of a job? A young official in the Ministry of Labor who is very familiar with the economic situation made this very pertinent remark to me: "In a way, we are just training young people as a means of reducing the unemployment figures!" It is true that many shortcomings remain linked to failure by the appropriate authorities to take genuine charge of the apprenticeship program. But that aberration also exists at the level of unemployed university graduates!

When are we going to be done with shortsighted government—indeed, one that operates on a day-to-day basis? When will it be necessary to do away with improvisation and makeshift solutions? "Governing means keeping the scales of justice the same for everyone," F.D. Roosevelt used to say. But to do that, one must possess the means of implementing one's policy and have elbow room!

Increase in Mining, Industrial Imports Explained

93AF0562C Algiers LIBERTE in French 14 Apr 93
p 10

[Unattributed article: "Artificial Rise in Prices for Industrial Imports in 1992"; words within slantlines published in English]

[Text] *Imports by the industrial and mining sector in 1992 rose to approximately \$2.9 billion (63 billion Algerian dinars [DA]) compared to 57 billion dinars in 1991, according to the minister of industry and mines. [sentence as published]*

Imports of producer goods for the industrial and mining sector totaled approximately \$1.9 billion (40.5 billion dinars).

Approximately \$1.4 billion (30 billion DA) went for raw materials, \$300 million (7.5 billion DA) for various supplies, and more than \$140 million (3 billion DA) for spare parts.

This total represented an increase of approximately 13 percent over the 1991 figure for imports of producer goods. According to the same source, however, the increase must be attributed primarily to the slippage in the value of the dinar and to the rise (of between 5 and 10 percent) in the prices for these imports.

This increase actually represented a decrease in the volume of the imports of producer goods between the two periods—an estimated average decrease of 10 percent that serves to explain the poor /performances/ in these productive activities.

Imports destined for investment rose to approximately \$320 million (7 billion DA)—a total slightly (3 percent) above the corresponding figure for 1991, which was 6.7 billion DA.

The total of foreign exchange payments made in /cash/ was estimated at approximately \$400 million (9.5 billion DA), compared to more than \$500 million (10 billion DA) [in 1991]. Cash payments in this sector are projected to total 13 billion DA (approximately \$600 million) in 1993.

Exports were estimated to total \$300 million—6.5 billion DA more than the 208 billion DA of export revenues recorded in 1992 for this sector. [sentence as published]

These exports included 2.1 billion DA for items of equipment, approximately 1.3 billion DA for steel products, 0.9 billion DA for chemical products and fertilizers, 0.6 billion DA for products of the mining industry, and more than 0.5 billion DA for textiles and leather.

This means that in terms of the trade balance for the industrial and mining sector, the total exports of this sector barely cover one-tenth of its imports, although they show an increase by approximately 1 billion DA (15 percent) over the figures recorded for 1991.

Local supplies acquired to meet the requirements of production operations have been estimated to total approximately 27.5 billion DA as against annual projections of more than 42 billion DA. This total represents an increase of approximately 8 billion DA over the figure for 1991.

It is pointed out, however, that this increase is probably explained more by the increases in the prices for these supplies than by an improved national integration brought about by means of genuine substitutions for imported raw materials.

In fact, it is emphasized that the ratio of total local purchases to total direct imports for the operations in this sector was two-thirds as of the end of December 1992 compared to one-half as of the end of June and also the end of September of the same year.

In actual fact, however, this ratio of integration of approximately 66 percent should not be so high, inasmuch as certain local supplies are actually imports brought in by other sectors of activity (for example, the wheat imported by the OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office] for the five food industry enterprises (ERIAD).

Commercial Code Tightened; Implications Noted

93AF0562A Algiers *EL WATAN* in French 17 Apr 93
pp 1, 3

[Article by Katia Debbouz: "A Cautious Game for State Enterprises"; word within slantlines published in English]

[Text] Algerian business enterprises are henceforth subject to being declared bankrupt. The adoption of this important measure—a measure that provides for commercial penalties—puts an end to the current practice of successively refinancing and maintaining "by perfusion" economic units that are neither economically viable nor commercially effective.

This amounts to overturning virtually the entire existing strategy with regard to business enterprises—a strategy that has prevailed for decades. It is an important step in the process of establishing a market economy.

The provisions relating to judicial liquidation are included in the amendments to the Commercial Code that have just been adopted by the cabinet.

This legislative decree puts an end to the process of refinancing the EPE [Public Economic Enterprises] that was expected to result in the effective restructuring of the enterprises. To date, however, there is no proof that this repeated refinancing has been effective.

Commercial penalties would henceforth be the principal—if not the sole—regulator of the market.

Private and public enterprises alike would accordingly have to meet the standards of commerciality and competitiveness or they would find themselves dispossessed.

The commercial tribunals will have the task of decreeing the liquidation of the nonviable enterprises.

Their decision will be based on a study of the books of account of these enterprises. If an enterprise shows net assets of less than one-quarter of its registered capital, it will shut its doors.

The commercial tribunal will grant the concerned enterprise a six-month grace period, however, during which

the enterprise will take action to save its movables [as published] (workers, creditors, and so forth) and thereby avoid bankruptcy.

If this effort is successful, a protocol of conciliation among the different parties will suspend the judicial liquidation procedure.

If it is not successful, the administrators or executive council of the enterprise will be responsible for the consequences of its debt.

In addition to this new provision, the legislative decree that amends and completes the Commercial Code provides for the creation of corporations through the offering of shares to private investors; privately owned companies; and closely held corporations.

These revised margins for maneuver should be utilized to group together the activities of these enterprises according to the sectors of industrial and financial activity in which the activities are conducted, as set forth in the proposed new Commercial Code. This is, in any case, the recommended framework of activity for reorganizing the capital structure of /holding/ companies.

These new types of companies will also make joint ventures possible between private and public capital.

The proposed Commercial Code also specifies, in this connection, that each corporation will be administered either by a board of directors of from three to 12 members or by an executive council consisting of a maximum of five persons. The code provides for the executive council to be appointed by an oversight council, which will supervise the corporation on a permanent basis.

Partners in a privately owned company, or shareholders in a closely held corporation, will not be responsible for the company's debts except to the extent of their share of the company's initial capital, whereas partners who are merchants shall be responsible indefinitely—and jointly and severally—for the company's debts.

Last, a corporation that offers shares to the public should attract investment capital from small and large investors alike. This option is probably the most reliable way to form large corporations.

Measures To Support Private Sector Criticized

93AF0592C Algiers *LIBERTE* in French
29 Apr 93 p 10

[Unattributed article: "CAP (Algerian Employers Confederation) National Council: 'The Measures in Favor of the Private Sector Are Inadequate"'; first paragraph is *LIBERTE* introduction]

[Text] The CAP [Algerian Employers Confederation] National Council expressed its concern and its displeasure following the latest government measures, which it deems inadequate, especially those concerning foreign exchange losses.

These measures involved "reshaping" the private sector debt resulting from the devaluation of the dinar, and accelerating the ad hoc committee's processing of private small businesses' applications for import financing—one of the ways to do so being to have an employers' representative attend committee meetings.

The participants believe that the private sector is not yet treated on an equal footing with the public sector, "in spite of the authorities' promises."

In this respect, the audience asked for publication of the names of the recipients of the \$2.5 million allocated by the ad hoc committee since its creation in October 1992.

They also challenged the government's request that, they said, they should "hibernate," pointing out that this meant "laying off employees, or even closing down businesses" during the three years of transition. "They ask us to hibernate, but who is going to take responsibility for the consequences?" one speaker asked. This is why, another suggested, "we must start acting, either through a lockout or by refusing to pay taxes."

Concerning partnerships with foreign companies, the CAP representatives advocated recourse, by priority, to partnerships between Algerian businesses, so as to prevent Algerian businesses from collapsing under the weight of excessive competition from foreign companies. Questions concerning privatization and debt rescheduling—the latter being viewed by many participants and their "only chance of survival"—will be thoroughly examined by the Confederation, the CAP president, Mr. Noureddine Amour, indicated.

He also stated that the CAP "has not, and will not call for" the resignation of the minister delegate to small business, Mr. Reda Hamiani, because, he said, Mr. Hamiani serves the private sector and represents "something gained." Some participants also raised the question of noncompliance with the CAP by-laws, saying that the quorum required to convene the National Council had not been reached.

The CAP president also reaffirmed his attachment to unity among employers' organizations.

"We must deploy all our efforts to form a single employers' organization," he said, taking this opportunity to announce that two new federations had joined the CAP—the National Federation of Transportation and Tourism, and the National Publishers Federation—which brings to 13 the number of organizations belonging to the CAP.

Role of Crime in Political Terrorism Discussed

93AF0599A Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*
in French 22-28 Apr 93 pp 13-14

[Article by Nadia Kerraz: "Terrorism: 'Uzis' and 'Scorpions,' Weapons of Death"; first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE introduction]

[Text] The happy outcome of the hostage taking that followed the failed holdup of the BNA [National Bank of Algeria] El-Affroun branch should not prevent us from realizing that, little by little, crime in Algeria has reached new heights.

Certainly, sociological mutations account for much of the changes in the methods and means used, but there is also another essential factor that promoted the "transition" from primary to "developed" criminality. This factor is of course terrorism. Worse still, the intensification of antiterrorist measures has "pushed" terrorists to go over to organized crime.

Criminals, too, were only too willing to use fundamentalist terrorism. From this juncture, a new type of violence, a new army was born. National security officials are well aware of this duality. In his interview with the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS, the minister of interior did not fail to stress this fact. Actually, speaking about the police's antiterrorist fight—a relentless fight, we should point out—Mr. Hardi stated that "armed violence in Algeria is not just political terrorism (...)." "Two distinct phenomena have now merged," he also said. The first phenomenon is organized crime and delinquency. The second is political terrorism. Now, we must recognize that "our security apparatus was not prepared to fight either of these two phenomena." In addition, because "terrorism has used organized crime and because organized crime has benefitted from terrorism," the resulting security situation is quite complex. As the minister of interior stated, it is "complex when it comes to analyzing it, understanding it, and finding a remedy for it."

But is this juncture between political terrorism and organized crime really surprising, considering that the now dissolved FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] relied on the social layer most affected economically, most deprived and impoverished to "replenish" its human reserves? This "soliciting" thus enabled the recruiting agents of ex-FIS to win over for their own ends ex-convicts, black marketeers, unemployed people, etc. The only thing these "troops" lacked was indoctrination.

This lack was soon remedied. But "men"—many of whom were still only innocent youths—no matter how loyal and faithful to the cause, were not enough. They had to be armed.

This was a prerequisite to the success of the insurrection planned by the leaders of this Islamist movement—which is actually just a branch of the fundamentalist international, the leaders of which are the Iran of the

Ayatollahs assisted by Sudan. In fact, it is common knowledge that the ex-FIS, which is still active in spite of being officially dissolved, and the fundamentalist movement as a whole are actively supported by Tehran and Khartoum. Their support ranges from financing to weapons, including military "training."

Arms Dealers

To supplement this foreign "solidarity," the ex-FIS took over the former arms dealers networks, which used to restrict themselves to hunting guns and automatic pistols. However, it would be a mistake to believe that the old traffic, which was purely commercial, completely disappeared.

The dismantling of a network in Setif, in which 700 people were involved, was evidence of that. Moreover, the confessions of the people arrested gave additional credit to that idea. They were mere arms "dealers." But this commercial traffic was taken over by politics. As a result, it now covers all types of arms. From the (modified) hunting gun to the most sophisticated micro- and mini-submachine guns, and including automatic pistols. What else could we expect when Afghanistan veterans are coming back home with their arms and gear. Better still, in El-Oued last August, the dismantling of two armed groups specialized in manufacturing bombs revealed the existence of veritable networks. At the National Gendarmerie command, we were told that "not one weapon has been imported since 1985." In 1992, there were 473 reported cases involving arms and explosives traffic. This was more than in each of the two previous years. Actually, in 1990, the National Gendarmerie reported 347 cases, and 381 in 1991.

Could this development be due to the very lucrative aspect of this traffic, and to a strong demand for these "tools"? Definitely. Otherwise, why would they take so many risks. Especially knowing that all arms traffickers incur the death penalty.

It is true also that the country's borders, especially in the southeast, are quite permeable, due to the vastness of the Saharan regions. In addition, these regions are not guarded well enough. As a result, the arms introduced into our country often transit through Libya. But it would be naive to believe that traffickers use only one route. Just look at customs statistics. According to figures published by EL MOUDJAHID on 29 October 1992, during the years 1990 and 1991, on the national territory as a whole, customs officers confiscated some 32 hunting guns, nine pistols including one 38-mm gun, one 18-mm automatic pistol, three 765-gauge pistols, and one clip-fed rifle. Also, during 1991, customs officers seized one Kalashnikov submachine gun.

These figures, however, fail to disclose the extent of the traffic. However, to these seized weapons we should add those that were stolen from assassinated policemen or during attacks against arms stores, and found again in the possession of killed or arrested terrorists. Thus, according to the police (EL MOUDJAHID, 29 October

1992) 20 automatic pistols and nine hunting guns were recovered during the first half of 1992.

The arms seized during the second half of the year were more numerous and more varied. They included submachine guns, Kalashnikovs, and "Perfecta"-brand pistols.

'Uzis' and 'Scorpions'

How many weapons are still out there? It is hard to say. We should remember that, in addition to the arms stolen recently, terrorists started to arm themselves over a decade ago. It is in this context that we should view the theft of 160 kg of TNT on a Sonatrach [National Highway Construction Company] construction site in 1982, and the attack of the Soumaa police academy in 1985. During that operation, over 300 weapons (light machine guns, automatic pistols, heavy machine guns, grenades, and ammunition) were taken away (AA dated 23 February to 1 March 1993).

To these attacks, we should add the Islamist command's attack against the Guemmar border-guard post.

The loot was rather sizable because "a large number of automatic weapons were stolen." But this does not in the least discourage the security forces. They are determined to eradicate the traffic. The multiplication of seizures and the dismantling of networks are perfect evidence of their determination. The last seizure to date was made by the National Gendarmerie; it recovered very sophisticated weapons. "Uzis" of Israeli origin, and "Scorpions" manufactured in the former Czechoslovakia are some of the highly efficient weapons, easy to conceal and to handle, that started appearing in Algeria last February; these arms are meant to spread death and terror in urban areas.

How could these arms reach the terrorists? Although it is difficult to theorize, the National Gendarmerie tends to think that they came through border posts.... Actually, these arms may well have been introduced into Algeria quite "legally."

All it would take is the [unwitting] complicity of one customs officer to whom the trafficker would tell that he was importing clothes or something else. Although we do not want to discredit the customs body as a whole, we should nevertheless ask how many agents posted at the border could in all conscience state that this "Uzi" or this "Scorpion" were not in that suitcase they let go through....

This being so, arms traffic is under control, we were told by the National Gendarmerie command. The presentation of the weapons seized to the press aimed, among other things, to make public opinion aware of the problem and to reassure it.

Stricter Court Rules in Criminal Cases

*93AF0562B Algiers ALGER REPUBLICAIN in French
16-17 Apr 93 p 3*

[Text] *The balance sheet as of 14 April: 21 persons sentenced to death, 16 persons sentenced to life imprisonment, 98 sentences of between three months and 20 years imprisonment, and 25 releases.*

Along with a number of important decisions taken by the cabinet last Wednesday, a serious study was made of the draft of the amendments to the legislative decree— promulgated last 30 September—that relates to the struggle against terrorism and subversion.

The purpose of these amendments is to grant the Special Courts more authority to enable them to process more quickly the criminal cases referred to them.

The authority of the presiding judges of the Special Courts is likewise strengthened, with a view to putting an end to the various maneuvers and incidents provoked by the attorneys for the accused. The presiding judge of a Special Court will be able henceforth to expel any attorney who employs obstructive tactics during court sessions. He will also be able to suspend from all professional activity—for a period of from three months to one year—any attorney who is guilty of incriminating behavior.

EGYPT**Commentary Links U.S. With Terrorism**

*93AF0565A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
28 Apr 93 p 53*

[Article by Faruq al-Tawil: "Terrorist Experiment 'Mice' in United States"]

[Text] The agents' train is full. In Lebanon, people seized a shaykh specialized in criticizing the United States coming out of the U.S. Embassy carrying a Samsonite briefcase. They said to him: We have caught you red-handed. Open the briefcase. The leading shaykh looked at them shrewdly and said: I threatened them with either war or the tribute. They chose to pay the tribute, and I took it. I cannot claim that all radicals or terrorists who make contacts with the United States take the tribute as the Lebanese shaykh did. I cannot say that 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman is a U.S. agent because the agents' train is full, because the United States hasn't announced a vacancy, and because 'Abd-al-Rahman's psychological and religious makeup prevents him from being a lackey. But 'Umar has fallen in love with the United States naively and he believes that it can achieve for him what he wants and can lead him to his heart's desire. The U.S. press and television stations have led him to believe that he is an influential Islamic leader. With the simplicity and naivete of the Fayyum citizen, 'Abd-al-Rahman believes that he will trick and deceive the United States, that he will spread Islam in the world's strongest capital,

and that he must stay at the top of the world there. This is why he has acknowledged Israel's right to exist, as has al-Turabi. They both believe that Israel is the key to U.S. satisfaction. 'Umar has shifted his group's activity from attacking Christians and churches to attacking tourists and then to attacking the police, the government, and the Egyptian economy so as to prevent Egypt from overcoming its crisis. Thus, the shaykh and his group, be they agents or honorable men, have turned into enemies of Egypt. I hold the U.S. administration above dealing with terrorists because it has been harmed by their activity. But there are U.S. councils, associations, societies, organizations, and research bodies that move freely and that have no connection with the United States or with European administrations. There are information-gathering circles that show great interest in Arab and Islamic affairs in order to protect their interests and the welfare of their citizens. This is why they have formed societies for kindness to terrorists and radicals and why they have planted dozens of their men among terrorists and radicals to lead them to believe that they are convinced of Islam as a religion so the terrorists will trust these plants. Thus, terrorists and radicals of all kinds and from all nationalities have turned into laboratory mice studied by U.S. and European research bodies to determine how they think, act, and live, how they react, and what their weak and strong points are. These bodies, which have conducted studies and research in the entire Arab and Islamic region, have completed their studies by taking along with them samples on which to conduct their experiments. This is a legitimate struggle and an acknowledged method of action between all countries of the world, both friendly and hostile, considering that gathering information and knowledge makes no distinction between friend and foe. This is because today's friends are tomorrow's enemies and yesterday's enemies are today's friends and because information gathering is vital to all regimes. The cards of the game are boundless. Information, secrets, and pressure cards appear and disappear and interests ultimately rule, even between friends, as we have seen in Israel's spying on the United States and vice versa.

Seeking Foe Whose Defeat Is 100-Percent Guaranteed

A basic rule is that a major power should seek an external foe. If no such foe exists, it has to create or manufacture him with its own hand so it can crush him from time to time to demonstrate its power to friends and neighbors, to turn the wheel of its military industry, and to train its armies to be prepared for a real enemy who could be imposed by circumstances and developments. Life without war is impossible. If war doesn't exist, countries create it. Moreover, any country's domestic problems are more difficult than external battles. Often, a government creates external battles to run away from solutions to its domestic problems, as is the case in Iran and Sudan currently. A foreign enemy strengthens numerous regimes and delays popular pressure for solutions to development issues. In Egypt, for example, we notice that awareness of, talk about, and demonstration for

solutions to our domestic problems escalated after our war with Israel. Domestic issues are closer to or very similar to the greater jihad whereas wars represent the minor jihad. U.S. domestic development and economic problems are more difficult than external U.S. wars. Clinton won the election on the basis of interest in domestic affairs, even though Bush had used the Gulf war, for example, to solve the economic problem and even though the United States has won countless billions from the Gulf. Today, the United States supports Russia's president and backs him financially so he can stand on his own feet and continue the game of struggle and balances among the major powers. We have also seen how Reagan chose a feeble foe named the Island of Grenada to be occupied in a matter of minutes and how he struck al-Qadhdhafi afterward. Bush then came to rally the world behind the Gulf war and to crush Saddam. The presence of an enemy is vital for the Western countries. This is why they are looking now for an Islamic enemy and why they spread myths about the Muslims' strength, saying that Muslims are the world's sixth power, that they are a threat to the world, that they control wealth, and that they exceed 1 billion in number, and they want to unite. Not only this. They also want to convert Christians to become Muslims like them. The Western countries lay traps for Muslims who fall into these traps with their naivete—traps such as those that talk of the Muslims' strength whereas the Westerners can direct any Islamic or Arab country by remote control. Let me cite here how Brzinski ridiculed the talk about the Islamic threat to the West by saying that it is the biggest strategic joke.

I would like to note an important point here, namely that they lump Arab Christians in the same basket with the Muslims, as proven by the fact that they have abandoned Palestinian Muslims [presumably Christians] to be trampled under Israeli feet. The Western countries view Muslims as bloody terrorist murderers who don't know their interests and who squander their wealth in pursuit of women. Western press, intellectuals, films, and television series vie in attributing this image to us, both Arabs and Muslims. Therefore, they keep 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman to reinforce this Islamic image in the mind of the American or the European. The shaykh is shown on television more than once daily to reaffirm to future generations the image of the Muslim and of Islam in the person of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman who talks about killing, destruction, and terrorism and who ridicules all systems.

Coexistence Among Faiths Is Solution

Terrorism and radicalism aren't in Islam alone. All religions have all kinds of radicalism and of imposition of opinion by force in obedience to the faith. Coexistence among religions is a vital necessity. It is the duty of intellectuals and thinkers to confront the activities of intelligence agencies which toy with everything and which use both clean and dirty cards, all of which are legitimate and protected by the law. At times, these cards are used at embassies and at other times they are used in

streets and alleys. But coexistence among religions is detrimental to the international economy, and that is why it will not develop.

Iranian Counterfeiting Operation Uncovered

93AF0569B Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
12 Apr 93 p 19

[Article by Jamal Tayi']

[Text] The security authorities recently uncovered Iranian attempts to smuggle counterfeit dollars into Egypt through overland crossings. Investigation has revealed that Iranian agents in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece circulate [the fake dollars].

Major General 'Isam Najm, assistant minister of interior for public funds administration, said that Iran has recently been active in flooding the Egyptian market. This has become evident as a result of an investigation by the administration that led to uncovering gangs and currency counterfeiters. This has come to the surface following an investigation by the harbor police of some Egyptian Arab, and foreign traders accused of circulating fake dollars in Egypt. They confessed that Iran is the source of the dollars, and that they bought them from agents in Cyprus and Lebanon.

Reasons Behind Interior Minister's Replacement

93AF0567A Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic
21 Apr 93 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mahmud al-Hadari, Hazim Munir, and Husayn al-Batrawi]

[Text] AL-AHALI has learned that the government has halted contacts by the so-called committee for mediation between the Interior Ministry and leaders of radical groups, that Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa was surprised by the decision to relieve him, and that this decision was not unrelated to the timing and manner of Musa's announcement on the mediation committee's contacts.

Political sources have revealed to AL-AHALI that the contacts, proposed by the mediation committee more than a month ago, were not unknown to the prime minister, considering that their feasibility was discussed last week and that a report has been submitted on them.

The same sources noted that Musa's announcement of the contacts caused him to be snared in a "media trap" laid by papers and individuals who are connected with the radicals and who seek to embarrass the government and to project the mediation within the context of mutual conditions exchanged by the Interior Ministry and the radicals. The sources added that the former minister pointed out to the prime minister that he had been compelled to announce the mediation in order to emphasize that it was made on an initiative by a number of clergymen. The minister also pointed out that he had

emphasized in his announcement the security agencies' ability to confront terrorism and to protect the state security and economy and the citizens' security. He also stressed he had emphasized to mediators that violence had to be halted on the ministry's terms.

It is worth noting that a number of high-ranking officials faulted Musa for expanding the security confrontation, which is also something against which Major General Hasan al-Alfi had previously warned when he exercised his duties as Asyut governor.

Information from the same sources indicates that selection of Maj. Gen. Hasan al-Alfi as the new interior minister will not drive the mediation committee to despair but it could put it in a different framework. The committee can determine the nature of this framework from the first statement made by al-Alfi after assuming the duties of his position. In the statement, al-Alfi called for "working calmly and rationally," pointing out that "whoever strays from legitimacy and the law will be confronted decisively." Al-Alfi also stressed the need for the "police and security agencies to adhere to justice, legitimacy, and provisions of the law." This statement emphasizes the power and authority of the government as a framework, on the one hand, and the need to tackle crises rationally, calmly, and decisively, on the other hand.

The same sources expect that the new interior minister will deal with radicalism and terrorism issues within a different context. They point out that in addition to being a policeman, al-Alfi has also worked as director of Public Money and Tax Evasion Intelligence and that he established a section for illicit profit in this agency. The sources do not find it unlikely that al-Alfi's tackling of the radicalism and terrorism issues will coincide with his opening of some corruption dossiers. These sources' expectation of this approach relies on a working paper al-Alfi presented to the president of the republic when he, as governor, feuded with a number of National Party deputies in Asyut. In the paper, al-Alfi emphasized that a comprehensive confrontation of radicalism and terrorism also comes by confronting corruption in its capacity as a lifeline of terrorism.

AL-AHALI has learned that within days, a committee of ulema and wise clergymen, referred to as the Group for Peacemaking and Mediation Between the Government and Radical Groups [as published], will meet with Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif to prepare the information climate and public opinion for a phase of mediation between the government and the groups to end the acts of violence. This meeting will be held as part of several meetings and of extensive activity seeking to make the mediation successful. In the coming period, matters may reach the point of holding a meeting with prominent political leaders. Informed sources have noted that President Husni Mubarak has received recently more than five reports on meetings held between security officials and the committee of ulema and clergymen on the

objective of this mediation and on the conditions set for accepting mediation with the groups.

The same sources have pointed out that the mediation idea was presented by Dr. Sayyid Rizq al-Tawil, leader of the Right Advocacy Group [as published], to Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali who liked the idea which was then presented to Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi last March. Ultimately, it was concluded that there was a need to form a neutral committee comprised of a number of clergymen specialized in various [theological] fields who are acceptable to both the government and the groups. Agreement was, in fact, reached on forming a committee including nearly 20 clergymen.

The committee excluded from its membership Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the country's mufti; Dr. 'Abd-al-Sabur Marzuq, secretary general of the Higher Islamic Affairs Council; Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq 'Ali Jad-al-Haqq, the rector of al-Azhar; and Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub, the awqaf minister, in their capacity as holders of official religious positions. Also excluded were any figures with a partisan quality and any clergymen holding official positions, such as al-Azhar University President Dr. 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Shaykh.

After debates on naming the group, it was agreed to call it the Group of Ulema and Sages for Peacemaking [as published]. The group's objective is to mediate between the government and radical groups to put an end to the acts of violence. The committee has held several meetings at Shaykh al-Sha'rawi's residence and at the premises of the Right Advocacy Group and the Islamic Religious Association, headed by Shaykh 'Abd-al-Latif Mushtahiri, who is a committee member.

The committee has chosen a number of attorneys to act as liaisons between the committee and radical group leaders. Attorney Muntasir al-Zayyat has been chosen as a main figure for contact with the committee, considering that he is an attorney who is most closely connected with leaders of radical groups.

The sources have disclosed that Muntasir al-Zayyat has visited some European countries and the United States where he has met with a number of group leaders and obtained their approval for the committee's intervention to mediate with the government.

After several contacts between the committee and ex-Interior Minister Major General Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, the committee invited the minister to a meeting to discuss the issue at Shaykh al-Sha'rawi's residence. But the minister invited them to his office. A meeting was actually held the Saturday before last between the committee and the ex-minister and it lasted five hours and was interspersed with evening prayers. Major General Musa reviewed for the committee the entire security situation and the violations the groups committed by assassinating a number of security figures, and the economic losses inflicted on the country as a result of the acts of violence targeted at tourism and the

national economy. Maj. Gen. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa agreed to the committee's mediation with strong reservations and with the provision that no direct contact is made with any members of radical groups and that the groups dictate no conditions that are likely to lead to deception and to enable the groups to gain time.

It was ultimately agreed that the committee would continue its efforts and contacts and that some of its members would be allowed to meet a number of group leaders in their jails. There have been conflicting reports on direct meetings between the committee and radical group leaders in jails. There are those who say that the committee has not yet met with anybody and that it has made a request to meet with group leaders and there are those who say that meetings have already taken place with 'Abbud al-Zummar, Karam Zuhdi, and Safwat 'Abd-al-Ghani. There are even those who say that arrangements have been made for a committee delegation to go to the United States and meet with Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the Jihad Group mufti, to discuss the matter with him.

At its meeting with the former minister, the committee agreed to keep the meetings and the contacts confidential, with the provision that a plenary meeting be held at the venerable al-Azhar to announce the outcome of the contacts and the mediation, in case a specific result is achieved. Major General Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir, the State Security Intelligence chief at the Interior Ministry, was to act as a permanent liaison between the committee and the ministry and as ministry representative at the meetings and to facilitate the committee's requests.

Mediation Terms

The former minister asserted from the outset that the government would not hold direct dialogue with the groups but that it would agree to the ulema's mediation to end the acts of violence and terrorism and to find out the true nature of the issue and of the groups' real future intentions.

Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-Halim Musa asked the committee for several fundamental conditions: That the groups put down their weapons and disclose their weapons and ammunition caches, that they stop their acts of terrorism and violence against security and the state generally, and that they turn themselves in and repent. Meanwhile, their rights will be preserved, meaning that no charges will be filed against them.

The interior minister touched on other future demands in case the mediation continues, namely: Disclose the groups' foreign contacts and expose the real leaders who plan the acts of violence.

Major General Musa also demanded that the groups end all contacts with countries that provide them with facilities, such as Iran and Sudan, and with Afghan Arabs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and that foreign terrorism

pockets and training centers controlled by the armed groups' leaders be liquidated.

On the other side, contacts made with group members through attorneys, especially through Muntasir al-Zayyat, have also resulted in several demands before the mediation is accepted, especially the release of an initial list of nearly 180 detainees; providing a count of the other detainees in preparation for releasing them; ending the policy of physical liquidation of group members; and terminating the oppressive treatment of members detained in jails.

The list of demands presented by the groups also called for ending the propaganda assault on the groups in all media and in the press, for abolishing military courts as a judiciary authority that examines the groups' cases, and for considering the issuance of a general presidential amnesty for all defendants against whom court sentences have been issued, especially by military courts.

Last week, the mediation committee held more than one meeting with Maj. Gen. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir, the State Security Intelligence chief. They all dealt with the facilities the committee needs in order to meet with jailed group leaders. The meetings also dealt with the feasibility of dialogue and of taking steps that prove goodwill on the part of the parties involved so as to develop a total solution to end the problem and to stop the mutual bloodshed. The meetings also discussed the guarantees needed for the success of the mediation committee, especially in the wake of the assassination of Major General Muhammad al-Shaymi, the Asyut assistant security director. This incident has affected the mediation and its survival.

Reservations by Groups

Sources close to the [committee for] mediation between the government and the groups point out that some group members have refused to engage in dialogue without adequate guarantees. They have also warned against the release of some of their leaders for fear that they will be liquidated by members of other groups, not by the police. The disagreement has escalated to another level, namely whether to continue the confrontation and the acts of terror, or what the groups call "legitimate jihad," or whether to suspend them and declare a truce until it becomes clear whether the dialogue is beneficial and serious or not.

This week witnessed the issuance of two statements in the Islamic group's name. The first announces that the group is prepared to halt the confrontation and to declare a truce with the security forces, especially in Asyut, until matters become completely clear and it points out that this truce has actually begun in some districts. Meanwhile, another statement issued in Asyut refuses to halt the confrontation and warns of what it calls a government maneuver to destroy the Islamic tendencies in Egypt.

A source close to the mediation committee has said that all this does not affect continuation of the committee's efforts and mediation, especially since all that has been accomplished so far is just contacts, "since we haven't accomplished anything specific, and since no direct and real meetings have begun yet." This source announced that despite the fact that the minister has announced the start of mediation, even though it had been agreed to announce it at a conference that was to be held at the venerable al-Azhar, this mediation will not come to a halt.

Security Stabilizes

High-ranking security officials have expressed such apprehension and doubts about the feasibility of the dialogue with the Islamic groups that one of them told AL-AHALI that this dialogue is tantamount to official acknowledgment on the government's part of the strength of these groups and tantamount to displaying the weakness of the government's various agencies in the face of these groups.

Security sources pointed out that some ideas presented by some mediators and attorneys seem to reflect sympathy for the groups, especially their observations regarding the media, party activity, and the right of groups to have legitimacy and to issue a newspaper, the same as society's other political factions and tendencies

Security leaders who have reservations about the dialogue have warned against "twisting the government's arm" and against embarrassing the government before the public in the name of a dialogue that did not prove useful in the past.

Security sources say that proof that some security circles disapprove of the dialogue is in the statement issued about Mustafa Mashhur's visit to Pakistan and the premeditated announcement about the committee's mediation, even though it had been agreed to keep its work confidential until it developed a solution.

Simultaneously, all contacts are with hearing committees and no specific agreement has been developed. However, meetings continue. The latest meeting was held last Saturday between the interior minister and a number of committee members at the Interior Ministry headquarters. It was agreed to continue the mediation.

Terrorism in Country Surveyed

93WR0240Z Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
30 Apr 93 pp 6-8

[Article by Sayyid Zaki: "These Are People Who Tried To Spread Ruination and Destruction in Egypt"]

[Text] Now that the terrorists who tried to assassinate Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif and who planted sabotage, destruction, and explosions in numerous areas have fallen, confessions have begun to expose the bloody

serial that is led by a few misguided people who receive their direct instructions from hired leaders in Afghanistan.

The suspects have made serious confessions [about schemes] to assassinate a number of public figures and police officers. They have also planned to deal new large-scale blows in al-Mansurah and Cairo to underline their presence and their strength.

We publish here details of the terrible criminal scheme through confessions we have obtained exclusively.

Important security sources have made statements to AL-MUSAWWAR asserting that the terrorists arrested recently were preparing for a large-scale blow in al-Mansurah and another in Cairo, that the orders to assassinate Safwat al-Sharif had been received a few days before the attempt was made, and that observation and surveillance of the minister's movements lasted no more than one week.

On the evening of the incident, the security agencies concluded two fundamental facts: First, Ashraf al-Sayyid Ibrahim was involved in the assassination attempt and [second] a participant in executing the operation who managed to escape had been under surveillance. The security agencies had the option to either apprehend him or let him go so he would lead them to all the other organization members.

We also learned from the confessions and from the investigations being made by the military prosecution currently that Ashraf Sa'id was on the scene of the incident in Caliph al-Ma'mun Street, but that he didn't participate part in the execution. His role was confined to observing and to supplying the weapons.

Ramadan, a terrorist, was the leader of the assassination team. After the operation, the perpetrators fled on foot. There were no cars awaiting them. They ran along the railroad track and proceeded from there to al-Suways [Suez] Bridge. The State Security Intelligence agencies tracked Ashraf [which of the two Ashrafs not specified] who fled to al-Mansurah and kept him, along with the other terrorist organization members, under surveillance there.

The terrorists tried to assassinate the information minister in this significant area, despite the danger and the risk that they were taking and of which they were well aware, to prove that they are present and that their arm can reach whomever they want to reach. But they were frustrated.

It has become certain to us from the confessions that the terrorists have enlisted recently the help of elements who had been arrested and convicted in terrorist cases previously because no new faces have joined them in the recent period. Rather, the terrorists have been joined by bands of fugitives who seek to secure "food and lodging."

The organization members are being currently confronted with eyewitnesses who have provided accurate information and descriptions, which had a major impact on getting to the culprits.

Among the vast arsenal of weapons, which were seized at the terrorists' dens (four apartments), it has been possible to identify the automatic rifle used in the failed attempt on the information minister's life.

Instructions had been given by terrorist leaders in Peshawar, headed by Shawqi al-Islambuli, that six terrorists with aliases, and they were among the eight apprehended terrorists, proceed to Egypt to carry out assassinations and to stage explosions there. The instructions were delivered through a team of aides, who had been kept under surveillance, at least 10 days before each incident. In this period, the terrorists made preparations and arrangements and gathered information.

In a matter of few days and as a result of concerted efforts by the security agencies in combing the areas where explosions had been staged and in questioning eyewitnesses who provided partial description of the perpetrators and of the manner of their escape from the crime scene, the elements suspected of perpetrating those incidents and crimes were identified by the State Security Agency. Foremost among those elements is the team, which made the attempt on Safwat al-Sharif's life, those responsible for the charge that exploded at the civil defense section and fire station in al-'Atabah area, and those involved in planning and placing explosive charges under tourist buses next to the museum and at al-Haram Street. Information has confirmed that the suspects belong to a group of the terrorist Jihad organization who went to Afghanistan to receive advanced military training in the art of combat and on manufacturing and using explosive charges. The information also confirms that they were assigned by the organization leaders abroad to return to Egypt to implement their terrorist scheme.

In light of the gathered information, a combined force of the State Security Intelligence and of al-Daqahliyah Criminal Intelligence on 24 April 1993 raided the main den of the suspects, located in an apartment on al-'Ahd al-Jadid Street in the city of al-Mansurah. The following leaders of the terrorist scheme were apprehended: Tariq 'Abd-al-Razzaq Hasan Isma'il Yusuf, born in Qina in 1964 and a former student at the Business School of Sawhaj University; Ahmad Husayn al-Husayni, born in al-Daqahliyah in 1969 and a student at the Science College of al-Mansurah University; Ibrahim al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Al, born in Asyut, unemployed; and Ashraf al-Sayyid Ibrahim Salih, born in 1963, unemployed, and an escaped defendant charged in the assassination of Dr. Faraj Fudah.

A number of passports, tickets, driving licenses, official seals, and wigs readied for use to escape, in case security forces tighten the noose, were seized. Also seized were a number of weapons and a quantity of ammunition and

explosives, namely: Two automatic rifles, two cartridges for automatic weapons, each containing 20 rounds, 26 7.62X39 caliber bullets, two defensive hand grenades, a 9-mm pistol with a cartridge containing nine rounds, a plastic bag containing a fuse, and a kerosene stove. More important, a piece of paper containing the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of some public figures was seized.

To complete their arrests, the security agencies raided the organization's other dens. In accordance with information provided by those already apprehended in al-Daqahliyah, al-Sharqiyah, al-Qalyubiyah, Cairo, and al-Jizah, four more people were arrested, namely: Hasan Ramadan 'Abdallah al-Shalaqani, born in al-Fayyum in 1966 and a graduate of the Agricultural Cooperation Institute; Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad al-Sayyid, born in al-Jamaliyah in 1966, a graduate of the Secretarial Institute, and a merchant engaged in the hemp trade; Hasan Muhammad Muhammad al-Sayyid, born in 1968 and a student at the 'Ayn Shams Business School; and Ahmad Muhammad Sadiq, an electrical engineer born in 1965. Another arsenal of weapons was discovered, including one automatic rifle, one pistol, 63 7.62X39 caliber bullets, 16 defensive grenades, one explosive charge inside a metal box, 22 chassis of electrical circuits, two cloth bags containing highly explosive materials, plastic putty, a large book hollowed to be used as a camouflaged trap, a two-hour timer, and coded organizational papers.

When interrogated, those apprehended made detailed confessions. Roles had been assigned to implement the terrorist scheme. Suspects Tariq 'Abd-al-Raziq Hasan and Ibrahim al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Al exploded the charge placed under a tourist bus in al-Tahrir on 16 March 1993.

Ibrahim al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Al and Hasan Ramadan 'Abdallah placed the charge that went off at the civil defense headquarters and fire station on 27 March 1993.

Ashraf al-Sayyid Ibrahim hurled an explosive charge on a tourist bus in al-Haram on 18 January 1993.

It also became evident that three men were involved in the attempt on Safwat al-Sharif's life, namely Ibrahim al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Al, Ahmad Husayn Ahmad al-Husayni, and Ashraf al-Sayyid Ibrahim, the suspect who supplied the former two with the weapon with which the attempt was made.

The suspects' confession went on to confirm information previously gathered by the State Security Intelligence on the involvement of some terrorist leaders living in Afghanistan in planning, issuing instructions, and financing the terrorist activity. These leaders are: Mustafa Ahmad Hasan Hamzah, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, and Muhammad Shawqi al-Islambuli, all of whom are escaped convicts, plus Tal'at Yasin Muhammad Hammam, an escaped convict. It isn't certain if Hammam has fled the country.

The security agencies have also found cars belonging to suspect Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad and two motorcycles belonging to suspect Ashraf al-Sayyid Ibrahim. They had been fitted by the terrorist organization members to be used in their future schemes. The military prosecution has begun interrogating the apprehended suspects.

Suspects whose photos had been previously published are still at large and they are wanted for involvement in planning to perpetrate other acts of violence and terrorism.

With the arrest of this organization's members, the security agencies have actually dealt the Islamic group, which has been behind all the recent destruction and devastation, an effective blow.

Government, Clerics Criticized for Terrorism Policy

*93LD0011C Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
12 Apr 93 pp 71-73*

[Article by Wahid Hamid: "Sadness and Wrath: We Are Still Awaiting Opinions of al-Azhar Rector and of Mufti"]

[Text] Instead of confronting the false slander against Islam, instead of confronting the plot to tear apart and divide the country, they accuse us (ROSE AL-YUSUF) of being infidels and atheists and enemies of Islam.

But the truth is that we are Muslims and that we are prepared to be martyred for Islam as revealed by God and preached by Muhammad. At the same time, we confront whoever tries to sabotage the faith and the country with ignorant [religious] legal opinions and with misguided ideas that have no support in the noble Koran or the honorable Sunna.

We acknowledge that Islam has many enemies, some of them from outside Islam and some from within. A reader who is aware of Islamic history makes an important conclusion, namely that Islam hasn't been affected as much by its external enemies as by its internal enemies. Even the crusades—which were a religious war, as acknowledged by their commanders, even though there other motives behind them—didn't shake Islam, not even slightly. Rather, Islam emerged from them triumphant, strong, and powerful. But come let us consider what some followers of Islam have done to the serene Islamic faith, beginning with the Khawarij and ending with dozens of other sects and denominations, such as the Assassins, the Baha'is, the Baharah, the Druze, and others. Even today's Khawarij [dissenters] have stabbed religion fatally, have torn it apart, and have tried to erase its divine teachings. They have incited sedition and innovated means of suppression and assassination. But Islam has continued to be lofty, thanks to the venerable Koran, the honorable Sunna, and strong ulema and jurisprudents who sought nothing but to please God and

preserve His religion. Credit also goes to strong rulers who struck with an iron fist and beheaded whoever tried to strike religion.

But in this age, we suffer from abasement and futile debate. If we say "this is false," the false say to us: You are infidels. Because they wear long beards and they have podiums from which to voice their opinions, machines to record tapes and printing presses to print books, rich financing sources, and information cadres trained in deception, their falsehood is rightness in the minds of innocent people. The media of present-day Khawarij brandish the weapon of declaring whoever confronts this furious wind of deception an "infidel."

They are entitled to declare us infidels and to permit shedding our blood, if they so wish, because they are present everywhere in word and in deed. Meanwhile, we are absent or eliminated at all levels and we deal with the most serious issues lightly and unsteadily! When ROSE AL-YUSUF exposed a false legal opinion that contradicts the Islamic faith and that ignites the fires of sedition, all government, religious, security, and popular agencies were supposed to rush to avert the danger and correct the matter to the common people, especially since the legal opinion was recorded on tape and distributed to people openly. But what happened is something that evokes sadness and wrath simultaneously. For example, the matter was settled at the esteemed Consultative Assembly by a member who declared that one shouldn't get his information from newspapers and magazines and that one mustn't believe them. Because the [session] chairman was Dr. Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, president of the Higher Press Council, we are entitled to ask him: Are newspapers and magazines published so the esteemed member can read in them his "horoscope" or figure out crossword puzzles? Are they published just as a formality and so people can use them ultimately as cones in which to put seeds or as rags with which to wipe glass clean? As long as one shouldn't believe what the press publishes, then why have newspapers and magazines in the first place and why not shut them down? If such is the case, then the tapes of 'Abd-al-Kafi and others are the definite source of information which the esteemed Consultative Assembly member acknowledges. Or perhaps the source of our information should be the pamphlets published by the radical groups! If this member tried to seek and explore the truth and then said whatever he wishes to say, we would accept the situation. But like a screaming bullet, he rushed to defend falsehood without any logic. Thus, he became a follower of falsehood even though he had sworn to work for the country's safety. Some like to say that we have democracy, that the press is free, and that every citizen is entitled to say whatever he wishes to say. If it is just a matter of yelling with nobody listening or responding, then it isn't democracy nor anything of the sort. Rather, it is a contemptible game that isn't much different from the tricks performed by circus jugglers and clowns. True democracy means embracing and enacting the right opinion, not just hearing it and letting it amount to no

more than mere words ultimately. Matters didn't end at this limit in the Consultative Assembly where one of the nation's sages rose to say: We must first determine who is a terrorist, who is radical, who is a zealot, who is a bigot, who is a moderate religious individual, and who is an immoderate religious individual? Immediately, the old question of "which comes first, the egg or the chicken" comes to mind, and we get immersed in debate while the country is lost and torn apart! In the past, we got preoccupied with the question of "who is a worker and who is a farmer?" To date, we haven't settled this question.

We also get sad and angry because we have truly prominent and learned clerics, some of whom hold official positions, such as his eminence the rector of al-Azhar, his eminence the mufti, and all the ulema of al-Azhar, the Legal Opinions Department, and the Awqaf Ministry. All these men should have confronted the matter as soon as they learned of it and immediately upon hearing 'Abd-al-Kafi's legal opinion. They should have judged it with the yardstick of Islam. This is their national and religious duty, especially since they are the soldiers of Islam. If they determine that 'Abd-al-Kafi's legal opinion is correct, then we should embrace and enact it and should ask the man to forgive us. If the legal opinion is false, then they are entitled to announce this and declare their legal opinion on what is a correct relationship between Muslim and Christian, without fear of being declared infidels or atheists. If this had been done, the catastrophe would have fallen and it would have been inevitable. But what happened is that his eminence the mufti decided to remain silent. And we haven't heard any comment from his eminence the rector of al-Azhar nor from other esteemed ulema. So the press had to perform its role in enlightening people, supporting right, and confronting the false legal opinions issued by 'Abd-al-Kafi who says that these opinions are dictated by the faith. Had clerics who are trusted for their learning and piety come forward and confronted the issue, they would have done great good and journalists would have turned their attention to some of the country's other issues. But where are the esteemed clerics? Why the silence and why this total disregard for the issue? Tell us: Are you right or are you in the wrong? We wish to hear from you. But we haven't heard from you, and this is why we get sad and angry.

When we come to the security agency's role, the sadness has a special flavor. It is evident that the security policy doesn't believe that "prevention is better than cure." These agencies are in a bloody struggle with the amirs [princes] of murder and explosions but they don't try to touch the amirs who preach the call, even though the law incriminates the acts of both the amirs of murder and the amirs who preach the call. The latter hatch the new generations of radicals and terrorists and take care of charging and equipping them. In his statements, the esteemed interior minister has called for popular participation in confronting terrorism. But his excellency hasn't told us how to participate. Should we clash with

the terrorists directly? Should we go to the amirs who preach the call, debate them, and tell them: You mislead the people? They will tell us: You are unbelievers. Consequently, popular anarchy will erupt. In the current case, the ordinary citizen's participation in fighting terrorism and radicalism should be in the form of notifying you [minister] of the source of danger. You are the party entrusted with applying the law. Mr. interior minister, you have been informed of these tapes and others. Your men have seized them and we have presented them to you. So why do you ignore and waste the law and why don't you use it to confront those who espouse devious religious ideas? Mr. interior minister, there is no doubt that by virtue of your position, you are aware of the text of Article 86 bis of the penal code, amended by law No. 97 of 1992. There is no doubt that you are aware of this article and others that incriminate whoever tries to undermine national unity and social peace. Yet, you deal with the radicals' tapes with the same logic with which you deal with dissolute songs! How can you ask for popular participation when you don't want to apply the law, which is the greatest support for popular participation in confronting terrorism and other problems? Do you have an answer, Mr. minister? You have the law and legitimacy at your disposal and yet you don't confront. You ask us to confront when we [don't have] the power to apply the law and we don't have the legitimate authority that enables us to confront others. Any illegitimate confrontation and any confrontation that doesn't rely on the law means civil war.

Because our media appease and don't confront, sadness in this case fills the eyes with tears and heart with sorrow. If the advocates of radicalism, terrorism, sedition, and ignorance have managed to create a mobile broadcasting station with their cassette tapes that have proliferated the country—and it is enough for the information officials to learn that 'Abd-al-Kafi has recorded more than 100 tapes containing 150 hours of transmission—and if the number of shaykhs who record tapes exceeds the number of singers, not to mention the tapes that come from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran, then propaganda confrontation becomes as inevitable as war. This confrontation can materialize only by presenting the issue to the public directly. Why shouldn't the text of 'Abd-al-Kafi's legal opinion be broadcast to the people as it is recorded in his own voice at a symposium attended by 'Abd-al-Kafi himself and at which he is debated by esteemed ulema? Why shouldn't this be done so the truth will be put before the people directly, and then some people will be absolved and some exposed. But the information policy doesn't encourage confrontation or the clash of ideas. This policy will decide that the ideal solution is to bring a shaykh who talks about relations between Muslim and Christian without referring to the real tragedy.

Because nobody cares, I, the movie writer, will tell 'Abd-al-Kafi: I have all the evidence and proofs you want, and they are all from the noble Koran and the orthodox Sunna, of the falsity of your allegation that one

shouldn't greet the Christian with wishes of peace and shouldn't share the Christian's holidays and happy occasions. I defy you to cite a single proof from the Koran or from the orthodox Sunna confirming your allegation. I say this, knowing full well that you have a group of male and female followers and that there are prominent figures among them, some of whom defend you. But this will never stop us from saying the truth. If there are those who gather wood to ignite a fire, then we, for the sake of the faith and the country, store water to extinguish it. But oh how numerous are those who gather the wood!

No Comment

A lady follower of 'Umar 'Abd-al-Kafi has said to me the "shaykh has actually made these statements. But you will go to hell because a Muslim mustn't expose another Muslim and reveal his fault to the people."

A police major general who holds an important position and who is a follower of the shaykh has also said, "Isn't Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd-al-Kafi better than the rector of al-Azhar who shows up on television and reads from a piece of paper?"

No comment.

Agriculture Minister Discusses Production

*93AF0546A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
27 Apr 93 p 4*

[Interview with Agriculture Minister Yusuf Wali by Raja' 'Abd-al-Malik; date not given: "Agriculture Minister Discusses Production"]

[Text] Egypt is currently going through an agricultural revival that has not happened before. This revival has accompanied a successful economic reform policy which international institutions have acknowledged.

Leading this revival is one of the most effective agriculture ministers of Egypt, Dr. Yusuf Wali, who is also deputy premier and secretary of the National Party. He is both honest and sincere...and he initiated the Mubarak project for land ownership for graduates in order to fight unemployment. So far, 35,000 youths have benefited from the project. He is also mainly responsible for the outstanding law that governs agricultural land owner-tenant relationship. Dr. Wali is also responsible for the veal project which solved Egypt's meat problem and even made it possible for Egypt to export meat. Incidentally, Dr. Wali is not responsible for the difficulties that this project is currently facing. Besides, Dr. Wali resorted to scientific research to increase agricultural production with the result that grain production now amounts to 14 million tons compared to 8 millions at the beginning of the eighties. Vegetables and fruits are abundant in markets at reasonable prices. Exports of agricultural products have also increased and accounted for one-third of Egypt's total exports in 1992. Furthermore, the agriculture minister liberated agriculture from all restrictions.

I interviewed Dr. Yusuf Wali, and his responses to my questions clarified some issues and problems, which are either completely or partly related to the agricultural sector. Providing food for the people depends on this vital sector (and whoever does not own his food, does not own his liberty).

[Abd-al-Malik] Which companies and organizations will remain under the ministry of agriculture's umbrella after the privatization of most companies and organizations that were affiliated to it? Thereafter, what will be the ministry's main task?

[Wali] The ministry's task during the coming period will be centered around research, agricultural guidance and related economic studies. Both the ministry and its affiliated agencies will be structured as follows: For example, let us consider the case of the General Organization for Reconstruction and Agricultural Development, which is one of the remaining organizations under the ministry's umbrella. Its role is to do research and provide guidance to managers of land reclamation projects in both the private and public sectors. Also, this organization is responsible for implementing some legislation for administering new land. The present agricultural policy has three bases, which are:

- Modernization and all research and guidance activities related to it;
- Liberalization, which means giving the private sector a free hand in its production projects and permitting individuals to own and manage all agriculture sector production projects;
- Legislation, which means providing the legislative framework for supporting efforts to liberalize Egyptian agriculture, protecting agricultural producers, and adhering to production requirement specifications.

Eighteen Million Tons of Grain

[Abd-al-Malik] How much grain do we now produce compared to 1982? Could you speak briefly about the production and imports of the following products? In addition, could you tell us if we are self-sufficient or approaching that goal in these products?

[Wali] Our grain production at present is 14 million tons versus 9 million tons at the beginning of the eighties; our goal is 18 million tons.

[Abd-al-Malik] What about wheat?

[Wali] At present, our nationwide production is approaching 5 million tons. Because of the increase in our production, there is now stability in the quantities of imports, and it is starting to decrease; currently, the ratio of imports to production is nearly the same.

[Abd-al-Malik] And rice?

[Wali] Currently, we are a rice exporting country. Our annual exports are 200,000 tons; even though in 1982 we were about to import rice for domestic consumption.

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] And beans?

[Wali] We have been self-sufficient in beans since 1982. Last year though, we had to import limited quantities of beans because of the decline in our production. However, last year was an exceptional one, and that does not deny achieving self-sufficiency the year before, and, God willing, next year.

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] And cotton?

[Wali] Last season, our cotton production increased by 1 million tons, which increased our export potential. We are working towards liberalizing the cotton trade and reopening the cotton exchange market this year. Also, we will introduce new cotton varieties, the first will be Mubarak 93, the results of which were good.

As for cooking-oil producing crops, we are increasing the areas under sunflower and soya beans. Besides, the increase in our cotton production as a result of our policy for liberalizing its growing will considerably increase our cotton seed oil production.

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] And sugarcane?

[Wali] Currently, our annual sugar production has reached the 1-million-ton figure. Nevertheless, we are importing 600,000 tons annually because of an increase in both our overall and per capita consumption. In fact, up until the beginning of the seventies, we were self-sufficient and consuming only 550,000 tons of sugar. In light of difficulties facing sugarcane growers, and to reinforce his excellency President Husni Mubarak's principle of preserving growers' interests, we are working towards raising the price of a ton of delivered sugarcane to 85 pounds instead of 66. Raising the sugarcane price is done to preserve the prime providers of our citizens' sugar needs, which are our local producers.

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] What about increasing the area under yellow corn in order to become self-sufficient in livestock feed?

[Wali] As we succeeded in producing 5.2 million tons of white corn in Egypt, it is possible to produce 1.6 million tons of yellow corn. Yet, we are concerned about growing yellow corn together with white corn because the latter is our main corn crop, the use of which we are considering for making bread. Using white corn in making bread would make it possible for us to become self-sufficient in wheat in a short period. Meanwhile, using white corn in the manufacturing of livestock feed is also under consideration. In addition, it is possible to use white corn in the manufacturing of poultry feed after adding some components in which it is deficient and are found in yellow corn.

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] What about meat and meat imports?

[Wali] In spite of the increase in consumption in meat and poultry resulting from the population growth, our imports of these products have dropped. Also, the value

of our fish exports cover that of fish imports because of the high price of Egyptian fish in European markets.

Feddans Total 7.4 Million

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] How many feddans have already been reclaimed and what is the cultivated area now compared to 1980 and before 1980?

[Wali] Feddans totalling 1.2 million have been reclaimed in the past 11 years. According to aerial photography maps, the cultivated area at present is 7.4 million feddans. During the seventies, there was no change in the cultivated area, which was 5.8 million feddans. In the first place, the increase in the cultivated area is due to the increased efforts of the private sector in the area of land reclamation year after year. President Muhammad Husni Mubarak then decided to lower the price of desert land if the land was reclaimed and cultivated within a fixed period. This decision was accompanied by the president's instructions to increase the area of reclaimed land to 150,000 feddans annually. With God's grace, this goal was met during the two previous plans, which brought the cultivated area to 7.4 million feddans.

Thirty-Five Thousand Graduates

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] How much of Mubarak's project has been accomplished to give graduates agricultural land for ownership? How many graduates now own land? Have the problems facing them been solved?

[Wali] About 35,000 youths have benefited from the project so far, and they have become a principal element in land reclamation plans. Part of the present plan is to annually give 10,000 youths land to own. However, this year, there are new developments in this project, so that in addition to owning reclaimed land, marketing facilities and distribution channels will be provided for those youths in order to consolidate the completion of all the project's activities. Besides, officials will continuously monitor the graduates' villages. Graduates are gaining experience daily about their environment and new communities. This experience enabled them to face the difficulties they encountered at the beginning of their land ownership period. The problems that remain are those simple problems of everyday life that producers encounter everywhere.

The Veal Project

[**'Abd-al-Malik**] What are your plans for the veal project, particularly since the supply ministry has withdrawn from it, and meat prices in the markets rose to 20 pounds a kilogram? Also, prices are steadily rising. The problem will thus be aggravated, and no solution has yet been found. We are also relying on imported decayed meat, most of which is either rotten or not suitable for human consumption.

[Wali] The termination of the veal project as it was previously administered was not because the ministries of supply and agriculture withdrew from it but because

of recent economic developments such as the gradual reduction in subsidies for production materials such as animal feed. Therefore, the project's resumption is now administered on different lines. For example, we have allotted 30 million pounds as circulatory loans for small breeders to breed young buffalo calves until they reach a certain weight; breeders are then free to market their products themselves. In this way we would fulfil the project's main goal, which is to increase the meat supply in order to balance prices. However, the present increase in meat prices is because of the beginning of the great month of "Ramadan." That means that prices will return to normal after "Ramadan." In addition, the veal project's production supply will also help prices go back to normal.

As for decayed meat. In Egypt there are extremely strict control processes that work together to protect our country from all foods that do not comply with international standard specifications. For example, one of the organizations affiliated with the agriculture ministry rejected a meat consignment because the allowable percentage of a certain harmful chemical was surpassed. The importer then sued the organization demanding 2 million pounds in compensation.

[`Abd-al-Malik] The ministry was considering unifying all laws governing desert land. A draft law was prepared to unify laws Nos. 100 and 143. What is the outcome of this issue...and what is the aim of unifying these laws?

[Wali] When law No. 7/1991 was issued, land reclamation, tourism expansion and settlement expansion regions were carefully defined. Governorates have taken over responsibility for administering construction land as well as vacant land in cultivated areas. Besides, governorates will get land sale returns to help them implement their development projects. The ministry will also return to the governorates the sale money for land belonging to them that it previously sold.

IRAQ

Unrest Reported Continuing in Baghdad, Other Areas

[Article by Salamah Ni'mat]

93AE0475A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 18 Apr 93
p 4

[Text] Amman, London—Iraqi opposition sources have reaffirmed that "disturbances" are continuing in Baghdad and other parts of the country. They said that forces of the special guard and special security are still deployed in some parts of the capital. They added that arrests have been made among the tribesmen of al-Jubur, Dubzat, and Lahib which reside in al-Qayyarah, Hammam al-'Alil, and Makhmur in Ninawa governorate.

But Iraqi foreign minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahaf, who yesterday arrived in Cairo in order to take part in the Arab League Council meetings, denied that any disturbances have taken place. He said the reiteration of such reports "is the work of Zionists carried out by the world media." He stressed that Iraq "is more stable than ever before."

In Amman, Western diplomatic sources yesterday were preoccupied with trying to obtain any information concerning media reports that disturbances have broken out in Baghdad and in some Iraqi towns and reports that there has been an attempt on the life of Minister of Interior Watban Ibrahim al-Hasan, Saddam Husayn's step brother.

Official Jordanian sources have denied that the Iraqi minister is in Jordan for treatment, following reports that he was injured in the attempt on his life. Iraqis arriving from Baghdad affirmed that the situation is "calm and normal."

But Western diplomatic sources, quoting eyewitnesses who were in Iraq, have confirmed that there have been "unusual military movements" on the approaches to Baghdad. It is worth noting that Western embassies—especially the United States, the British, and the French—hold regular diplomatic meetings in order to assess the situation in Baghdad because these countries have no diplomats there. They rely particularly on what Iraqi travelers report on arrival in Jordan and what the media says. This is in addition to some reports based on satellite pictures and Western intelligence analysis.

The consensus among analysts is that President Saddam Husayn has been able in recent years to tighten his control on all the vital sources of power inside the regime by appointing family members and relatives at the top. This would make any change in the regime dependent upon one part of the president's relatives rising against the other part.

In Baghdad, Reuters reported yesterday that the newspaper BABIL reiterated Iraq's claim on Kuwait, saying that Baghdad will "one day liberate what it considers to be its 19th governorate."

The newspaper, which is published by President Husayn's eldest son, seized the opportunity of the anniversary of Iraq's 17 April 1988 retrieval of Fao Island in southern Iraq from Iran after eight years of war, to draw a comparison with Kuwait.

In a headline, it said: "Fao...Kuwait...A Continued Liberation, God willing."

ISRAEL

Withdrawal Scenarios Said Completed, Stored Away

93AA0050C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Apr 93
p B3

[Article by Aluf Ben: "Withdrawal Plans in the Drawer"]

[Text] In recent months, the chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak, has been engaged in vigorous denial of the possibility that the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] are preparing contingency plans for withdrawal from the Golan Heights, within the framework of a peace accord with Syria. Barak, caught in a parliamentary ambush conducted by MK [member of Knesset] Binyamin Netanyahu, claimed that the time has not yet come for this. Netanyahu stated in a session of the foreign and defense affairs committee that the withdrawal plans are already piling up in the drawers at general headquarters.

Upon his retirement, the former head of the planning branch, Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, reinforced the statements by the chief of staff, when he said that the IDF does not have any plans for withdrawal from the Golan Heights: "Simply put, there are no such plans, and that is all there is to it."

Apparently, Barak and Mitzna were not looking in the right drawer. During the term of the first Rabin government, 1974-77, the planning branch of general headquarters prepared a detailed plan for a peace accord with Syria. A team headed by Maj. Gen. Avraham Tamir, who founded the planning branch and then headed it, wrote a proposal for a peace agreement in stages, including specification of the security arrangements and delineation of the essence of the peace and the normalization of relations, and plans for interim accords and a permanent accord. Tamir's planning branch also drew maps of interim borders and permanent borders, the areas of disengagement, and the future deployment of the Israeli and Syrian armies.

The interim accord with Syria, which was developed by the planning branch in the mid-1970's, was termed the "two-shoulder plan." It was based upon partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, leaving the IDF in two key areas: "the northern shoulder," the ridge line of Mount Hermon and the volcanic promontories extending from its base—which control the northern Golan Heights and provide military warning in the direction of Damascus; and the "southern shoulder," the El Al-Pik ridge—which controls the Sea of Galilee and the Yarmuch and the Jordan valleys. In the central Golan Heights, the plan presented possibilities for withdrawal that differed from one other with regard to the depth of the territory to be returned to Syrian control.

According to the proposal for the interim accord, the area from which Israel will withdraw in the Golan Heights will be demilitarized of forces and military infrastructure, and UN forces will supervise the security

arrangements (they are currently speaking of a multinational force that will be mainly American, like on the border with Egypt).

In the absence of negotiations with Syria, the plans were buried in an archive. Several weeks ago, however, they were removed from there and brought to the office of a senior official in the defense establishment, who asked to examine the old files and get ideas for the current peace talks from them.

But something has changed in Israel between the first and second Rabin governments. In the 1970's, Tamir and his aides at the planning branch were not afraid to prepare detailed plans for withdrawal by stages from the Sinai and from the Golan Heights and for the establishment of autonomy in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, within the framework of the long-term strategic planning of the defense establishment; while in the 1990's, their successors are engaged in explanations of why there is no need for such contingency plans.

The IDF planning branch, which has always been the only governmental body to engage in long-term political planning, began to write the proposals for peace accords during the negotiations for the disengagement of forces with Egypt and Syria, subsequent to the Yom Kippur War. After the signing of the disengagement accords, the planning branch continued in its work during the negotiations for an interim accord with Egypt in 1975, and toward possible negotiations with Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

The disengagement agreements and the interim agreements of 1974-75 stipulated the form of the security arrangements that were subsequently maintained in the peace agreement with Egypt, in the agreement with Lebanon of May 1983—which remained unrealized—and in the peace plans with Syria, which have remained in the archives in the meantime. The disengagement agreements put concepts like demilitarized areas and diluted areas (in which a limited military force is maintained) on the map of the Middle East, along with a warning layout and the presence of United States forces between Israel and Arab countries.

As head of the planning branch, Tamir represented the ministry of defense in the interministerial committee of senior officials for peace planning, headed by the then director general of the office of the prime minister, Mordehai Gazit. The Gazit committee formulated contingency documents for peace accords on all the borders. Among other things, these documents were based upon the work of the planning branch of the IDF. But Rabin paid little attention to the committee, and it dispersed after the signing of the interim agreement in the summer of 1975.

In 1976, Maj. Gen. Tamir submitted a comprehensive plan for peace accords between Israel and its neighbors to Minister of Defense Peres. According to government policy at that time, Tamir proposed accords in two stages: an interim accord for the termination of the state

of war in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to interim borders, and a permanent agreement in which final borders would be determined and a solution would be found to the Palestinian problem. In the first stage, the dominant element in the accords would be the maintenance of security on Israel's borders. In the second and final stage, regional defense arrangements would be instituted, based upon mutual disarmament and defense and economic collaboration.

During those years, the planning branch was already examining proposals for arms control in the Middle East and mutual supervisory arrangements among the countries of the region, and it raised the question of the possible penetration of weapons of mass destruction into the region.

The freedom of activity that Tamir received as an IDF general, in terms of wording recommendations on clearly political issues, was facilitated by the parallel subordination of the planning branch to Chief of Staff Mordehai Gur and Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, beginning in 1975. Under the military hat, the planning branch engaged in the preparation of the multiannual plan for building up the IDF, the determination of establishments, and the organization of military units. Under the civilian hat, it engaged in the formulation of political assessments for the minister of defense, the planning of peace accords, and coordination of matters of national infrastructure with civilian governmental ministries.

Chief of Staff Gur granted the planning branch political independence, and the peace plans prepared by Tamir were not considered binding documents of general headquarters, but internal working documents of the planning branch.

In 1979, Minister of Defense Ezer Weizmann divided the planning branch into two units: the military planning branch at general headquarters, and the unit for national defense [UND] at the ministry of defense, headed by Tamir. The military did not like the UND. During Ari'el Sharon's term as minister of defense, he was accused of establishing a competing general headquarters. After Sharon left, the unit was disbanded. Since then, the IDF has blocked any attempt to establish a planning organization adjacent to the minister of defense or the ministry of defense. The IDF currently enjoys exclusivity in the preparation of long-term plans, the formulation of strategic assessments, and consultation to the political level.

In recent years, there has been disagreement in the defense establishment regarding the desirable organization of the planning branch, in light of the issue of instructions by the high command defining its responsibilities and powers. The director general of the ministry of defense, David Ivri, first proposed that the planning branch be subordinated to him, as well. Another proposal by the ministry of defense was that the planning branch in the IDF concentrate its activity on the military, and not engage in political affairs. Such a structure will remove the division dealing in political strategic

planning from the domain of the planning branch. Over the past year, this division has expanded, in light of the peace process.

The chief of staff, Ehud Barak, objects to sharing the "ownership" of the planning branch with the ministry of defense. He prefers to retain control of it himself. Rabin has still not decided on the controversy, and the expected resumption of the peace talks this week again raises the question in full strength: the planning branch of general headquarters is the only body that has the ability to contend with the preparation for the peace accords. But in the current political situation, the IDF will find it difficult to prepare peace plans without becoming involved in a partisan debate.

Peace Now Platform on Resumption of Talks

93AA0050B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Apr 93 p B1

[Newspaper advertisement presenting Peace Now's position with regard to peace negotiations]

[Text] A New Peace Initiative. Peace Now. The Peace Now movement extends its blessing upon the commencement of the peace talks.

We call upon the prime minister to adopt a courageous peace initiative now, in order to further the negotiations with the Palestinians and with Syria. Such an initiative shall place us on the road to peace and shall be based upon the following points:

On the Palestinian issue:

1. Within the framework of an interim agreement, Israel shall transfer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip the administration of their own affairs, except for foreign affairs and defense matters. During this period, the Palestinians shall establish self-government, which shall derive its authority from the residents of the occupied territories themselves. This shall include control over most of the land.
2. The Arab residents of East Jerusalem shall be entitled to vote and be elected to the institutes of the self-government.
3. The interim accord, which shall be based upon [Security Council Resolutions] 242 and 338, shall constitute an interim stage to a permanent accord, which shall be discussed upon the conclusion of the third year of the existence of the interim accord. The objective of the permanent accord is to guarantee peace and security for both peoples, on the basis of mutual self-determination and out of Israeli willingness to transfer all of the territories occupied by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to the government that shall be defined by the residents of the territories.

4. Israel shall negotiate with a Palestinian delegation that shall be acceptable to all Palestinians, and shall renounce its objection to the participation of PLO representatives in the negotiations.

5. Israel shall act toward the honoring of human rights in the territories, pursuant to international conventions, shall undertake to refrain from deportations and demolition of homes, and shall minimize punishments such as administrative detention, curfews, closure of the territories, etc. The Palestinians shall act toward the cessation of terrorism against Israelis in the territories and within the Green Line.

6. Israel shall completely halt all activity designed to transfer its citizens to residency in the territories, and shall refrain from construction and expansion of its infrastructure in the territories and in the Gaza Strip.

7. The possibility of promoting an accord to include Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip at an accelerated schedule and without waiting for the period defined in the interim agreement to pass shall be examined.

On the Syrian issue:

Within the framework of a full peace agreement, Israel shall recognize Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Israel shall declare its willingness to withdraw from the Golan in stages, within the framework of a full peace agreement, while maintaining strict defense arrangements, including the demilitarization of the Golan and of areas in Syria itself. Moreover, the parties shall agree to a long period of gradual interim accords. During this period of time, the parties shall examine the fulfillment of the terms of the agreement. Within this framework, the issues of the water sources and the question of Lebanon and the security zone shall be solved, and United States and international guarantees for the agreement shall be provided.

* Contributions to this information campaign can be sent to P.O. Box 8159, Jerusalem 91081, or directly to Bank Hapoalim, Account No. 177909.

Economic Potential of Regional Peace Accords

93AA0078A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Apr 93 p 20

[Interview of Professor Hayim Ben-Shahar by Ora Zarnitzky; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are DAVAR introduction]

[Text] Professor Hayim Ben-Shahar is, undoubtedly, one of the preeminent figures in Israeli economics. For two decades, his name has surfaced not only in the context of the important posts he has held, as chairman of the economic circle and president of Tel Aviv University, but also as someone who has offered advice and had a hand in making decisions on economic matters. Before the 1981 elections, he was even the Labor Alignment's candidate for finance minister.

In recent years, his name has appeared in the media less, and those who expected that the Alignment's ascension to power would bring him to the center of economic action have been disappointed. Ben-Shahar, however, continues to come and go in the corridors of government, where his opinion is highly regarded.

[Zarnitzky] Prof. Ben-Shahar, what are your current activities?

[Ben-Shahar] Ten years ago, I retired from the presidency of Tel Aviv University. Since 1975, I have been involved in drafting tax reforms, and by the completion of my term as president of the university, I found myself defined as a "public figure."

I still lecture and teach but only half-time. I also direct the "Hammer Fund," which is engaged in cooperative projects in the Middle East, a subject that we began 12 years ago and is now bearing fruit. I am also involved in the program to build a school of economics in memory of Eytan Bergels.

In cooperation with a large team of economists of the first rank, business men and government experts, I have assumed the responsibility of serving as adviser to the government in all matters touching on making policy regarding Israel's economic relations with autonomy in the West Bank, if it should arise. Similarly, I am working as part of a public committee recently formed by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Mikha Harish, to make recommendations on simplifying and speeding up procedures for approving and carrying out new investments.

In addition, I operate a small economic consultation office, through which I work with clients from Israeli industry, the kibbutz movement, and foreign investors.

That, more or less, is what I am doing now. It is all by my choice, and so I feel as free as a bird.

[Zarnitzky] What is your opinion of the finance minister's decision to reduce the power of the banks in Israel's economy?

[Ben-Shahar] I haven't delved deeply enough into this subject to take a public position on the discussion now under way. Any serious approach to the issue requires finding the golden path between two principles: assuring competition in the money market, the capital market and the business sector generally, and assuring the stability and soundness of the banks.

There is a basis for the belief that advantages of scale apply to banks, so that a bigger bank is sounder and more stable than a small one. On the other hand, large banks acquire economic and business power that, in an economy as small as ours, must be regulated so that it does not affect competition.

The discussion today turns on these elements.

[Zarnitzky] The current situation in Israel is that there are funds and ventures, but they are not realized because of bureaucratic snags.

[Ben-Shahar] It's true that money is available, but the number of opportunities for new investments and their scope are exceptionally small. There is the additional problem that when the money and opportunities for investment exist, the process of approval and implementation of the investment sometimes drags on for years because of bureaucratic and legal foul-ups. Getting approval of grants for a project takes seven months on average. If we're speaking of a new factory, you first need to have land allocated, so you have to go the Israeli land authority. The land authority works through its district offices, and these must coordinate with local authorities—a process that on average takes another 14 months, so we're already almost up to two years. Now you must put it into effect, you need permits from the various government bureaus—and this can consume another two years.

In the modern world, in which everything changes quickly, a project four years later is no longer of interest.

Minister of Industry and Trade Harish understood this very quickly. He asked me to serve as chairman of a committee to examine the subject and recommended ways for simplifying and drastically shortening these procedures. At this point, I am studying the matter.

[Zarnitzky] It seems to me that on the issue of cutting the bureaucracy for investments, there have been more committees than action. Aren't you afraid that your committee will have a similar fate?

[Ben-Shahar] Indeed, I was afraid of that. But I felt that the subject is important enough to justify another try, and I am optimistic because we have the support of Minister Harish and Finance Minister [Avraham] Beiga Shohat, and the prime minister has promised his support and backing for a change in other departments, including legislation. So it seems that this time will be different.

[Zarnitzky] Are there other economic reasons, apart from red tape, preventing foreign investment in Israel?

[Ben-Shahar] Israel offers vast opportunities. In the past decade, we've also opened up more to international ties. At the same time, there are external factors, such as the Arab boycott, for example, that inhibit investments. The boycott is cracking, thanks to the peace process, and the Arab states have even put on the agenda an offer to suspend the boycott if we attain an agreement. As a result, our position in the world of international business has also improved. Foreign companies are interested in investing in Israel—and on our scale of things, a small interest is sufficient to produce effective results.

There are, of course, economic aspects as well. The policy we had here in 1988-89 led to an economic recession and that, of course, influenced investments.

Today, there are buds of economic growth and the chance exists for more and more projects.

[Zarnitzky] The subject of investments is one side of the subject of growth. On the other side stands the problem of unemployment. Are we really doing what can be done to solve this problem?

[Ben-Shahar] The problem of unemployment is more serious than is thought, so its solution is much more difficult than people think. Israel today has more than 200,000 unemployed, about 12 percent of those who have jobs. Each year, another 80,000 people join the labor force, half of them by natural increase and the rest from immigration. That is a growth of 5 percent in the labor force. In other words, if we want to reduce unemployment, we have to absorb at least 5 percent. Given that there is an increase in productivity of 2 percent each year, absorption of that additional manpower means annual growth of 7 percent—and more than that is needed to reduce unemployment. So, to eliminate unemployment, the economy must grow at least 9 to 9.5 percent each year for six years. That is by no means simple. Even growth of 6 to 7 percent is a considerable economic achievement, and that's why we haven't solved the problem of unemployment.

Growth around the world now is 1 to 2 percent—and that is called coming out of a recession. Under normal conditions, growth of 3 percent is considered very nice. Japan, which has grown at a rate of 5 to 6 percent, is regarded as a great success story. From the perspective of economic growth, Israel today stands at the apex of the western world with 6 to 7 percent.

[Zarnitzky] If so, perhaps there is room for Labor and Welfare Minister Ora Namir's proposal for public work projects.

[Ben-Shahar] Not at all. Public work projects will put 30,000 people to work with shovels, which is just pathetic. I also don't know where that would take us in social terms. The solution must be economic. The finance minister has devoted whole days to this subject and teams have given it thought. It may be possible to do still more, but it's impossible to solve such a problem from one day to the next.

[Zarnitzky] If the closure continues, maybe Israelis will take the places of Arab workers.

[Ben-Shahar] Primarily because of terror, it is now popular to say that, but we must remember the kind of work the Palestinians do—mostly low-cost, unskilled, hard physical labor. Is that the sort of Israeli worker that we want to cultivate?

[Zarnitzky] Perhaps there is a need to shift the whole system in the direction of knowledge-intensive industry.

[Ben-Shahar] Certainly, but that takes time. Growth is going in that direction, but it is not enough to absorb the glut of unemployed. I believe that we are now on the

way, which is a good thing from an economic point of view, but in terms of unemployment, growth is not quick enough.

[Zarnitzky] You are dealing with the economic implications of the peace process. How did you get involved in that?

[Ben-Shahar] When I became president of Tel Aviv University in 1975, I assembled a so-called "brainstorming" group to look into what the university could do in public service. One of the issues that we took up was the peace process. None of us was thinking then of peace, but we thought that the university needed to serve the public in ways other than teaching and basic research by thinking ahead on issues that might come up only in another 20 years.

We then formed the first team whose members included, among others, Prof. Itamar Rabinovitch, Prof. Hayim Shaged, Prof. Shim'on Shamir, the economist Prof. Ze'ev Hirsch and others from various academic disciplines. In the wake of the ideas raised by the team, I conceived the idea to open a center for peace studies. I turned to David Rockefeller, whom I knew had contacts throughout the Western world, and he responded, although only partially at first. After Sadat's visit, however, he became enthusiastic. With his help, we made progress in preparing working papers and formulating varying views. This work led to a proposal for a series of projects, including a "water canal."

I met Dr. Armand Hammer on the eve of Camp David in 1978. I asked him to underwrite the provocative project's plans. Hammer was a "legendary" figure in the business world because he had founded and directed one of the world's largest oil corporations, Occidental Petroleum, but he refused to support Israel and Israeli projects due to his global oil interests. Occidental had production rights in Libya even though he was Jewish.

For instance, I went to him at the right time with an idea that had always been close to my heart: economics in the service of peace. To my joy, he agreed to head a group of contributors for the project's benefit. His first appearance in public on Israel's behalf was with us. The entire Jewish community in Los Angeles became passionately involved and contributed immense sums, and Hammer surprised everyone with an announcement that he would match all the other donations combined. That was the start that put momentum in our work.

[Zarnitzky] What is the "Hammer Fund" investigating?

[Ben-Shahar] We are pinpointing subjects appropriate for economic cooperation in the Middle East. One project is laying a gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel, through the Sinai, which will carry gas to the power plant in Ashqelon and the new plant to be built near Ziqim. These generators consume a large portion of the energy of Israel's electrical output. We thought that instead of coal, which badly pollutes the environment, it was possible to use gas. Gas is clean and the Egyptians have

more than they use. Hammer was very excited and said that Occidental would lay the pipeline. Moshe Shahal was then minister of energy and dealt with Egypt's energy minister, but the Egyptians eventually canceled the project.

We have another plan for a joint fertilizer factory in which the Israel Chemicals Corporation, in partnership with an Egyptian company, will build a jointly run plant to produce fertilizers made from potassium and phosphorus from Israel and cheap nitrogen from Egypt, as we haven't any of that. A third plan, raised as early as the time of Sadat's visit, and that we developed in the "Hammer Fund," concerned transporting water from the Nile through the Sinai to the Gaza Strip and the Negev.

These three plans were presented to the Egyptians. The idea was that in exchange for entering into negotiations over Taba, they would agree to at least one of these projects. But the Taba process was blocked on the ground because of disagreements between the Likud and the Labor Alignment. In the end, we went to arbitration, in which we lost everything. In any case, these plans are still available and some of them undoubtedly are relevant to the current peace period as well.

[Zarnitzky] What is the "Hammer Fund" studying right now?

posal not long ago entitled "The Red Sea Riviera," dealing with a number of plans for the Eilat coast, Aqaba, and Taba. We propose municipal cooperation between the nearby cities of Aqaba and Eilat, including common infrastructure services such as an international airport and conversion of the two ports that now exist just kilometers apart into a single harbor. The port would be built on the edge of a channel 12 km long in the 'Arava, ships would be funneled into it and the entire Red Sea coast would be opened to tourism.

In addition, and this may be the crux of the matter, we propose opening the borders between Egypt, Israel, and Jordan in a strip along the coast from the Coral Island through Taba, the coral beach in Eilat, and the Jordan coast from 'Aqaba to Saudi Arabia. The strip would run along the shore to a depth of 1 km. Tourists would be able to travel freely in the strip, and that would draw international corporations to build a most attractive tourist zone. This plan, which is the most logical in economic terms, can serve as a brilliant example of the potential of economic cooperation in the Middle East.

We have put forth and described in detail dozens of plans like these. Since the Madrid Conference, it has become clear that the only place in the world where know-how and proposals for economic cooperation in the Middle East have come together is the "Hammer Fund." We are flooded with requests from international actors to hear our proposals. That includes governments, international institutions and organizations, and international corporations. We have placed everything at the service of the Israeli government to aid the negotiations,

especially the multilateral committees. We recently received signals from Arab sources who have read our proposals and are interested in discussing them through the appropriate channels.

I believe that Israel's economic achievements could have been much greater had there been peace. The Arab boycott has caused heavy damage to Israel's economy and blocked its progress. Many Western corporations have not done business with us, bought our products, shared information with us or invested in Israel. I now see a most realistic chance, through the peace process, to have the boycott lifted. That could give the continued development of Israel's economy a real shot in the arm.

[Zarnitzky] And what about autonomy?

[Ben-Shahar] If there is autonomy tightly linked to Jordan, a very interesting potential exists for contacts with the Middle East.

[Zarnitzky] Can Israel, as the most developed state in the region, become a sort of Hong Kong of the Middle East?

[Ben-Shahar] Objectively speaking, without a doubt. But we have to be careful not to be seen as condescending, as people who think that we're above our neighbors. That's one of the things that guides us when we make proposals. There is a balance in all our proposals. The development that you're talking about will occur naturally, but we don't want to preach it.

One may assume that when multinational corporations need to establish their bases in the Middle East, they will find that the advanced communications services and technological capability are here, but there is no need to push, it will happen of itself.

The system of relations with the neighboring Arab states in the Middle East can be developed through autonomy. The entity that will arise, if it does, will form a bridge between us and Jordan. If there are open borders with the autonomous entity and with Jordan, the route to other places will also open. Israeli goods, whether under an Israeli label or sold in a Palestinian or Jordanian company's packaging, could penetrate the entire Middle East, and goods from the Middle East could go to Israel.

[Zarnitzky] You are the chairman of this committee. What is the committee's role?

[Ben-Shahar] I would not want to elaborate on that at this stage. Generally, it's an advisory committee to the government on the subject of economic relations between Israel and the autonomous entity, should it arise. The committee engages in planning and providing a preliminary response to a breakthrough in the negotiations, particularly between Israel and the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Should there be a breakthrough, we will need to reach agreement on the nature of autonomy. When autonomy is in place, they will be permitted to regulate their internal affairs, but domestic economic management is impossible without relations with Israel.

The economy of the territories today is highly dependent on Israel's economy. Some indications of this are that a third of the manpower of the territories worked in Israel before the closure and that some 30 percent of the income in the territories came from employment in Israel. In addition, most imports to the territories come from Israel and a large portion of its exports go to Israel.

This is a very close dependency, such that the interests of all involved are that there be no economic crisis following the creation of autonomy, which would cause social unrest and possibly set off a political crisis. With this in mind, we need to weigh what we want and what the other side would be interested in receiving. This, in fact, is exactly what the committee has been working on. I estimate that we will present our recommendations to the government in one to two months.

[Zarnitzky] Is there no fear that economic activity under autonomy will endanger sectors or branches of the Israeli economy?

[Ben-Shahar] I still would rather not talk about that because the committee's work is classified.

[Zarnitzky] The industrialists and farmers have formed working groups and prepared papers for the government on this issue. They're afraid of a process by which autonomy will entail construction of factories that will compete with them, especially those using cheap labor.

[Ben-Shahar] The moment there are open borders and much greater freedom of activity for the Palestinians, they will indeed embark on enterprises that will create competition.

[Zarnitzky] This competition is a healthy thing.

[Ben-Shahar] It is a healthy thing, but the way isn't smooth, which makes it hard. We definitely need to find a way to compensate for the damage that will be caused, by retraining or other means. But we don't need to panic too much—the economy in the territories is only 5 percent the size of Israel's. Their national income also includes the wages that they earn in Israel; their national product is 3 to 3.5 percent of Israel's—in other words, we are not speaking of a great shock. It won't cripple the Israeli economy. At most, it is a local problem and we can compensate anyone who is hurt.

[Zarnitzky] Recent reports say that you have done a comprehensive study on reforming the oil sector.

[Ben-Shahar] That work was done in collaboration with Prof. Tzvi Adar and Prof. Amir Barnea. It took more than a year and covered all important aspects of this complex sector. We support the goals of a reform designed to make the oil economy more efficient and to improve the welfare of the consumer, but the emphasis must be on two key areas. First, refineries. This is a giant company wielding vast power which, if left unregulated, could become a monopoly controlling the entire sector. Therefore, we recommend splitting the corporation into two companies with refinery facilities in Haifa and

Ashdod. The cost of breaking it up is relatively low and the benefits of preventing a monopoly are much greater.

The second critical issue is retailing at gas stations. We must enable unimpeded entry of entrepreneurs and new companies and, at the same time, grant the right to increase the number of stations, which today is prohibited by law.

[Zarnitzky] Prof. Parkinson, the inventor of the well-known law, recently died. Is his theory also applicable to Israel?

[Ben-Shahar] I have no answer to that. I regret that I'm not as illustrious as Parkinson. But I can tell you a story about my meeting with him. He came to Israel when I was president of Tel Aviv University. Among other things, he visited the university and met me at a reception. He said, "I'll tell you what Tel Aviv University's two diseases are. You have magnificent administration buildings and drab school buildings. Your main fiscal problem is the medical library, which swallows up the budget and leaves nothing for the rest of the colleges."

I told him, "This is the first time you've gone wrong. First of all, the administration is housed in shacks while the schools have buildings. As for the medical library, it's maintained through activities of the hospitals and, in fact, is funded mostly by them. We provide only a small portion of their revenues, a supplement for professors; most of their money comes from the hospitals. All clinical instruction is done in the hospitals and the medical library budget is very small."

Prof. Parkinson looked at me in wonder and then said, "Yours is the only university in the world administered like this. I've never seen anything like it." That did my heart good.

Leak of Sa'ar-5 Secrets Concerns Defense Circles
93AA0050A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by Aluf Ben, Ha'aretz Defense Correspondent: "Concern in the Defense Establishment Regarding Exposure of Sa'ar-5 Ship Secrets in a Foreign Magazine"]

[Text] Defense officials have expressed great concern regarding the exposure of sensitive operational-technological information about the new Sa'ar -5 naval battleships in the last issue of the professional magazine *International Defense Review*.

These officials sought to find out how the information had reached the British correspondent for the magazine, David Foxwell, who visited Israel approximately two and a half months ago and met with senior officers in the Navy and with employees of the military industries that are partners in the ship project.

The three Sa'ar-5 ships (also called Lahav) are being built at the Litton-Ingalls shipyards in the United States. The

first of them, Ahi Eilat, was launched in a festive ceremony last month. The ships are supposed to become operational next year.

In the article on the Sa'ar-5 in the *International Defense Review*, it was stated that the ships would grant the Navy "a new dimension of ability." According to the magazine, this is the first time that the Israeli Navy has equipped itself with a perfect battle system on a ship.

In the contract between the ministry of defense and the American shipyard, it was stipulated that Litton-Ingalls will be able to sell the Sa'ar-5 to foreign customers, and will pay royalties to the Government of Israel. The defense industries that developed the electronic systems for the corvettes hope to obtain export transactions in this manner. Apparently the providing of the information to the foreign journalist was intended as a sales promotion.

The magazine published specific details of the Israeli systems that were developed for the Sa'ar-5. A review of the electronic warfare system developed by Elisra noted the sensitivity of reception and the level of the precision of identification of hostile radar signals directed toward the ship. Elbit will provide the Sa'ar-5 with a launcher for deception elements, directed against the radars of ships and sea-to-sea missiles.

In the article, Foxwell delineates the number of deception elements that the corvette will carry.

The British magazine published the full specification documents for the radar, the submarine detection systems, the method of electronic communication between the subsystems on the ship, and the structure of its command system.

The head contractor for the electronic systems in the Sa'ar-5 is the Mabat plant of Israel Aircraft Industries. Most of the defense industries in Israel are partners in the project, among them Elbit, Tadiran, Elta, Rafa'el, Elisra, and Astronautics.

International Defense Review also contained information about the upgrade program for the Sa'ar-4.5 Navy missile ships, which have been in service since the early 1980's. They are currently being rebuilt at Israel shipyards in Haifa. A new upper bridge will be installed, similar to that of the Sa'ar-5, differentiated by a reduced radar ("the sneak").

JORDAN

Methods of Zionist Fifth Column Reported
93AA0048A Amman AL-RIBAT in Arabic 14 Apr 93 p 2

[Commentary by Samih al-Mu'ayatah: "Zionist Fifth Column"]

[Text] Groups of Arab and Islamic societies can be divided into three groups in the way they view the Jewish, Zionist enemy:

- A group that considers the Jewish, Zionist presence on Arab territory as a cultural contradiction for the Arab and Islamic world and a threat to Arab and Islamic existence, geographically, demographically, culturally, and politically. Negotiations with this enemy are considered a violation of the community's interests and the components of its existence, since any "peace" process will be unable to change the Zionist enemy's expansionist, aggressive nature.
- The second group does business with the Zionist enemy, by virtue of its being political. Human and political reality must recognize its right to exist on Arab territory within the context of a political process that will end the state of war and maintain Arab political entities. This group, in its view, relies on a political understanding of the realities of the international and regional situation.
- The third group believes in the need to accept the Zionist entity into the region's political, social, and economic system. It also believes in a need for coexistence and full normalization between Zionism and the Arab and Islamic people, not just compliance with the political situation, but with faith and conviction in the need for it. There is no doubt that this group constitutes a true danger for the community, because of its ideas and because of its suspicious connections with Zionist and Western movements, institutions, and security and political agencies.

During the decades of clashing with the Zionist enemy, this group was clearly active and was in constant agreement with the approach of Arab regimes toward negotiations with the Zionist enemy and penetration of the barrier of hatred for this enemy. This group emerged clearly in Egypt, especially after the Camp David Agreements were signed and Egypt opened to Zionist penetration.

In Jordan, since the start of negotiations with the Zionist enemy, the activities of this suspicious group have begun to increase, exploiting this political plan in order to spread Zionism, increase normalization with the Zionist enemy, and disseminate ideas that serve the Zionists.

The most important manifestations and entities that this group represents are:

1. The Masonic movement is one of Zionism's arms, which extends deeply into the Arab political arena. Among its ranks are many influential decision-makers in many important positions in political and Arab entities, located in many world policy-making, educational, and economic centers. Therefore, the Masonic movement, since it carries Zionist ideas, and by virtue of the fact that it is an executive tool for Zionist plots, represents the backbone of the Zionist fifth column on Arab soil in general, and in Jordan in particular.

Despite the fact that this movement depicts itself as a charitable and social organization, it is most influential in the making of many decisions and policies. Jordanian political parties are not free of certain Masonic parties that talk about national interests and unionist ideas because they cannot change that. However, they will be a partisan arm for this suspicious movement.

2. There are certain cultural and economic institutions that have begun to whisper about the start of the "parade of Zionism" [misrah al-Sahinah] and normalization, through certain initiatives toward establishing relations or opening branches for it in Palestine, within the context of normalization. There is also talk about issuing books and pamphlets to contribute to the growth of that circle of believers in coexistence with the Zionist enemy, under cover of world peace and regional cooperation of Middle East countries.

3. Certain power centers and influential political circles are trying to spread their ideas and concepts among decision-makers and circles of influence. The danger of this group is increasing, because it contributes to formulating "national" decisions in both foreign and domestic policy.

4. Certain writers and journalists, both those who openly practice it as well as those who speak on television [passage blacked out in original text] behind the scenes. There are also those who inform us, from time to time, of ideas and proposals from which emanate the stench of Zionism and the suspicious connection, under cover of freedom of expression and political and intellectual plurality.

Therefore, resisting the Zionist danger to Jordan is a necessary and national holy obligation, even for those who accept the negotiations. The option of negotiations has not for one day been the only way to regain our rights. We must not open the way for Zionism to occupy our minds, erase our culture, and steal our resources and capabilities. Perhaps the first step in resisting the Zionist enemy, and his expansionist, aggressive danger, is to uproot from our land its lackeys, who are operating on our soil, and who form a Zionist fifth column.

This is a job for the state, as well as the mission of every citizen that eagerly carries national, Arab, and Islamic concerns in his heart and mind.

SUDAN

Powerful Personalities Behind Government

93AF0589A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
4 May 93 pp 22-23

[Article: "These Are Sudan's Rulers"]

[Text] Even though four years have lapsed since Colonel 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir assumed power in Sudan, the question that has been asked thousands of times and that continues to be asked is: Who is Sudan's actual ruler?

The following article offers a synopsis of Sudan's strongmen who run Sudan's government, each according to his qualities and tendencies:

Brigadier General 'Umar Hasan: Regime's Facade

On the morning of 30 June 1989, Brigadier General [rank as published] 'Umar Hasan broadcast a communique in which he announced that the armed forces had taken control of the government. The communique then proceeded to talk about the aspirations of securing an honorable life for the people and of restoring Sudan's foreign relations.

At the time, some armed forces officers listened to the communique with surprise because they had not heard of a brigadier general named 'Umar Hasan among their ranks. Then this officer was shown on television and some surprised officers commented that this was 'Umar al-Bashir, the [Islamic] Front representative in the armed forces. The officers then realized that concealment of the full name by which he was known in the armed forces was a part of the large-scale deception process with which the Front sought to hide details of the coup.

Some time after the coup was took place, it became evident that Brigadier General al-Bashir had moved among all or most of the officers' underground movements but that he certainly belonged to the Front and that his aspirations couldn't surpass it under any circumstance. This is why it has been difficult for him to keep his commitments to other heads of states when such commitments are rejected by the Front. Consequently, some heads of state prefer now to talk to al-Turabi instead of al-Bashir. These leaders believe that al-Turabi is the original and al-Bashir is the shadow.

Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah: A Soldier Who Has Leaped Over All Officers

Colonel Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah was one of the engineers and executors of the Front's coup and is one of its military wing officers. Currently, he holds the position of National Assembly (appointed parliament) president. He has retired so the assembly would be endowed with a "democratic" quality and so the colonel would be given special powers in his capacity as the number two man behind Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir personally, considering that the National Assembly president is the individual who succeeds the Revolutionary Council chairman and follows him in protocol. This step was tantamount to diminishing the status of Major General al-Zubayr, the declared vice chairman, who has been entrusted with the ministry of interior, which is a ministry without powers because all the security powers belong to independent security agencies belonging to the Front directly.

Colonel Khalifah is a self-made man who entered the military corps as an ordinary private in the signal corps. He read and educated himself. Upon passing the high

school examination, he was sent to the War College where he moved from private to the officers' ranks.

After the coup, Colonel Khalifah held the position of deputy chairman of the political committee and was in constant disagreement with Brigadier General 'Uthman Ahmad Hasan, the committee chairman, who resigned from the assembly and the government, along with Major General Faysal Abu-Salih, the interior minister, because of conflicts over the Front's monopolization of power and of the regime's alignment with Iraq during the Gulf war.

Colonel Khalifah headed the national dialogue conference for peace. Since then, he has been the official overseeing peace negotiations with the Southerners, whereas the actual engineer of these negotiations is Dr. 'Ali al-Hajj.

It is worth noting that since its coup, the Front has entrusted discussions concerning the southern issue to its cadres solely, beginning with Col. Muhammad al-Amin Khalifah and ending with Dr. 'Ali al-Hajj, who has held the post of political officer in charge of the Front's political bureau. It should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the ministry concerned with this issue, is totally isolated from any task connected with peace in the south.

'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha: Man Who Executed the Coup and Who Rules Behind the Scenes

Attorney 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha graduated from the Khartoum University Law College in the mid-1970's when Numayri was in power. Even though Taha is the youngest among al-Turabi's front-line, he is the most influential, has a greater share of the leadership, and is al-Turabi's favorite.

Al-Turabi justifies his selection of Taha by saying that he represents the youth generation in the movement and that the youth's aspirations must find appreciated representation so that the link among generations will continue and so the march will be completed. In expression of this continuity, al-Turabi has encouraged and welcomed Taha as his deputy. Meanwhile, others of al-Turabi's generation see that what Taha is planning puts a great distance between his leadership and that of the others. He appears to be marginalizing the elders and to be preoccupied with embracing the youth. He is thereby gaining a base among the youth so that he can defeat the elders that form the elite and prevent the emergence among them of anybody aspiring to succeed al-Turabi.

Attorney 'Ali 'Uthman Taha can be described as the man of difficult tasks. He is the man who has been and continues to be in charge of the Front's military wing in the armed forces. Under cover of being the opposition leader in the democratic parliamentary assembly, Taha went to the South, inspected the armed forces, and supplied them with some aid prior to the coup—a coup said to have been staged under his supervision.

Perhaps what shows that he supervised the coup is the fact that he was not one of the Front leaders arrested on the eve of the coup. Thus, he was able to carry on with the task of implementing the coup. Perhaps he is the Front's only prominent leader who was not arrested. According to the testimony of some officers who have since been executed, Taha took refuge in a mosque close to the armed forces command. From there, he continued to communicate with those active in the coup.

A prominent example that shows that 'Ali 'Uthman Muhammad Taha prefers to operate behind the scenes is that he did not try to assume any ministerial position during the latest democratic administration.

Taha is Sudan's prime minister by all criteria, al-Turabi is Sudan's president, and al-Bashir is the representative of both men in official appearances.

Dr. Hasan al-Turabi: His Strongest Weapon is the Principle of the 'End Justifies the Means'

Dr. Hasan 'Abdallah al-Turabi, secretary general of the Islamic National Front, is over 60. But he has been a controversial figure since he was a young man.

In the early 1960s, he assumed the position of the Muslim Brotherhood grand master in Sudan, even though he was not a well-known figure among the pioneers who brought the idea over from Cairo, or among the Khartoum University students who embraced the idea.

By all criteria, al-Turabi is a reformer who proceeds based on the principle of the "end justifies the means."

In his book, "The Islamic Movement in Sudan," al-Turabi says that his movement took advantage of all conditions under democracy and under military rule. Under democracy, his movement allies itself with this or that force and embellishes itself in all forms. Under military administrations, it retreats to review its course and mistakes and to adopt new plans.

Under Numayri's administration in particular, the movement devoted attention to economics and built a broad economic base for itself. Through its organization, al-Turabi infiltrated Arab Islamic organizations, delivered their leadership positions to his men, and employed them to serve his party's economic and political interests.

When Numayri's regime ended, the Front emerged under a new name, the Islamic National Front, which replaced its old name of The Islamic Charter Front.

In the wake of the Front's coup, al-Turabi became the regime's spiritual leader. In their private sessions, some of his followers call him "Khomeyni," while calling 'Ali 'Uthman, Rafsanjani, because the latter is the government's top executive.

Because al-Turabi always uses his law studies to take precautions for acts issuing from his Front, on the eve of

the coup he asked the coup makers to arrest him, along with a group of his first-line men. Thus, if the coup failed, the arrest would avert suspicion away from them. If the coup succeeded, al-Turabi would find out through his presence in jail the way in which the opposition leaders planned to resist the regime and would develop plans to counter the opposition from within prison.

In the Gulf war, al-Turabi supported Iraq and tried to recruit all fundamentalist movements to support the invasion. At the same time, he had a strategic alliance with Iran. Al-Turabi embraces Hamas. But at the same time, he has told the French LE MONDE that Arabs and Israelis can coexist. Thus, it seems that he wagers on a thing and its opposite.

These days, al-Turabi never tires of talking about his being diverted from developments inside Sudan, now that he is secretary general of the Popular Islamic Arab Congress, which is the public face of the fundamentalist organizations in the Arab world, and about his being preoccupied mainly with his international concerns.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Shiddu: From Defending May Leaders to Defending Human Rights Violations

'Abd-al-'Aziz Shiddu was a student with al-Turabi and Numayri at the Hantub High School. But the fact that he was al-Turabi's fellow student, even at law school, does not mean that there was any common denominator in their thinking and way of life. Shiddu was closer to the secularists, if not in his political affiliation, at least in his behavior.

Shiddu rose in the judiciary ranks until he became a supreme court magistrate. When he was dismissed during the Numayri administration, he went to Yemen where he worked as a magistrate.

When the Numayri regime was toppled by the April 1985 popular uprising, Shiddu gained prominence as the attorney who defended that regime's symbols most strongly, thus angering the ordinary Sudanese citizen. Spontaneous demonstrations proceeded to his office and slogans were chanted against him and his defense of the May leaders.

When the Front seized power, it had no bond whatsoever with Shiddu until it selected as education minister Sayyid Sabdarat, an attorney whose ambitions and success enabled him to become a part of Shiddu's law office. When the regime selected Sabdarat to be education minister, despite his leftist tendencies, Sabdarat tried to have his office partner justice minister, which is what has happened.

Shiddu, who has never been known to belong to or to sympathize with the Muslim Brotherhood, finds himself now facing the entire world to deflect the denunciations aimed at the Front for its human rights violations.

In any case, a report by a British Labor Party deputy who visited Sudan a few weeks ago refers specifically to an admission by the justice minister that there are ghost houses, arrests, and torture.

Commentary on Country's Policies

93AE0577B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
13 Apr 93 p 9

[Article by Ahmad Hamrush: "Whither Sudan?"]

[Text] I do not know where Sudan's regime is rushing or what it wants. If it were only the repression, terrorism, and torture that the Sudanese people are now suffering, we should say that it was in order to strengthen the authority of the National Islamic Front (NIF) headed by Hasan al-Turabi. This in itself would be objectionable and repellent. But the Sudanese regime's actions have gone beyond the borders and have become a threat to the peace and security of a number of Arab countries, a source of slander, and a rending of Arab solidarity.

From no Arab country's capital have Arab ambassadors been withdrawn, except Sudan's. With no Arab country have diplomatic relations been severed after the Gulf war, except Sudan. The most recent decision of this sort came a few days ago from Algeria, which withdrew its ambassador from Khartoum and severed its diplomatic relations with Tehran. It was preceded in the matter by Tunisia. Never have Egyptian-Sudanese relations reached such a state of tension and mistrust as now.

Sudan's regime has embarked on many provocative measures and decisions contrary to the interests of the Sudanese people. It has closed the Khartoum branch of Cairo University, along with the Egyptian mission's schools, which historically have contributed to the progress of enlightenment. It has banished the preachers of venerable al-Azhar. It has arrested the head of the Egyptian community in Sudan as a hostage for the arrest of several of Sudanese terrorists who participated in a number of criminal operations. President Husni Mubarak has stated that there are 5 million Sudanese brothers now living in Egypt—proof of the extent of the suffering of the Sudanese people in their homeland and the depth of friendship between the fraternal peoples of Egypt and Sudan.

The Sudanese regime exercises its authority by violating democracy and human rights and imposing a curfew. A number of international organizations active in humanitarian fields have been led to describe it as a repugnant regime that must be called to task. In this week's session in Gabon of the parliamentary council that includes representatives of the EC and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group, a number of European parliamentarians demanded that Sudan be kept from speaking because of its continued human rights violations and policy of racial and religious discrimination.

Sudan is a country of many nationalities and religions. The government should deal equally with everyone. It

should respect all religions and beliefs. It should work to stop the civil war, which no sooner abates than it flares up anew. However, the shortsightedness of officials in the NIF, which controls the regime, has made the NIF rush singlemindedly in the direction of forcing people against their will to yield to the NIF's methods, which are at odds with the tolerance of true Islam, violate the spirit of genuine Arab solidarity, and threaten the principles of democracy and human rights.

For example, the eighth meeting of Arab solidarity committees was held this week in Tunisia with the participation of the Sudanese solidarity committee formed in Cairo. The regime in Sudan issued a decision dissolving the committee existing in Khartoum and arresting its chairman as soon as the military coup took place. Al-Tahir (Byur), chairman of the Higher Islamic Council in southern Sudan, announced in a speech at the Union of Egyptian Journalists that Muslims in the south are suffering only from the actions of the NIF, which is headed by the highly questionable Hasan al-Turabi.

Wasn't Hasan al-Turabi the close adviser of Ja'far Numayri when agreement was given to carry out the plan to transport Ethiopia's Falasha Jews to Israel via Sudan?

Didn't Hasan al-Turabi put himself in prison with the leaders arrested at the beginning of the military coup in order to complete the deception and camouflage the coup's nature, because he understood the position of the Sudanese people rejecting his backward, terrorist NIF?

Didn't Hasan al-Turabi strengthen Sudan's relations with Iran on the common bases of exporting revolution, encouraging terrorism, drawing the Arab terrorist organizations together, and imposing a coercive system of government that gives no weight to the will of peoples who aspire to a free, modern life?

What justification can Hasan al-Turabi offer when he visits the United States and Canada to meet officials there for the extremist slogans and the exaggerated words that prevail in Sudan?

Is there any explanation for the extensive wealth in which the leaders of the NIF live—the NIF that Hasan al-Turabi leads and that controls banks and companies—or any explanation for the degrading poverty the Sudanese people suffer? In his speeches in Britain and America, Hasan al-Turabi tried to deny this poverty and paint a rosy picture, at a time when the dollar exchange rate has reached 150 Sudanese pounds. Prices have risen more than twentyfold during his regime and purchasing power has become limited.

Many questions pursue Hasan al-Turabi and condemn the regime's method of dealing with domestic and foreign affairs.

Domestically, this week's arrest of Sudan's former prime minister and head of the Ummah Party and the Ansar,

al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, along with a number of his aides, added a new dimension to the violations of democracy and human rights.

On the international scene, while 'Umar al-Bashir was speaking in Libya about Arab solidarity, the Sudanese regime was working to rend this solidarity and aim heavy blows at the security and stability of certain Arab countries.

All of us in Egypt understand such moves. Al-Bashir and al-Turabi are trying to cover them with a veil of deception and camouflage. If Egypt until now has followed a policy of self-control, suppressing anger, and concern for sound relations between the two fraternal peoples by not severing diplomatic relations, this should be taken into account by Sudan's rulers. Otherwise, matters may deteriorate deplorably, given the pronouncements we have heard from 'Umar al-Bashir while reviewing military maneuvers along the Egyptian-Sudanese border. Some armed forces branches and the NIF's defense militia participated, and the maneuvers meant a threat and excitement of passions.

Al-Turabi and al-Bashir need to listen to the voice of reason and wisdom. We ask: Whither Sudan?

Al-Bashir Will Review Egyptian-Sudanese Agreements

*93AF0573B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 13 May 93
p 7*

[Article by 'Omar Muhammad Hassan and 'Osman Jabril]

[Text] The Sudanese president, Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir, said that the Hala'ib crisis is "part of external pressures coinciding" with ongoing negotiations being held in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, between al-Bashir's government and its opponents. 'Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad Husayn, the Sudanese interior minister, threatened that Khartoum might reconsider its bilateral agreements with Egypt. For the first time, Sudan mentions that it may reconsider the Nile waters agreement signed with Egypt in 1959. In spite of that, Cairo has avoided responding to Sudan's allegations and has taken little notice of them.

The spokesperson for the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs, Ambassador Naji al-Ghatrifi, told AL-HAYAH that "the Sudanese regime's irresponsible behavior and false allegations should have no impact on relations between the Egyptian and Sudanese people." He also declared that "the Egyptian political leadership would not—under any circumstances—use force against Sudan."

In Cairo, AL-HAYAH learned that the Egyptian ambassador to Khartoum, Dr. Hassan Jad-al-Haq, sent a report about the latest disarray in the relations between the two

countries to the foreign affairs minister, 'Amr Musa, at Manama, where he is accompanying Egyptian President Mubarak on his Gulf tour.

There was also word that Egyptian authorities had refused entry to two Sudanese diplomats, Mahmud Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani and al-Sadiq 'Abd-al-Aziz 'Abdallah, who are first secretaries in the Sudanese foreign affairs ministry. The two had reached Cairo airport Tuesday on a Pakistani plane arriving from Karachi. AL-HAYAH learned that the office of the foreign affairs ministry at the airport had requested permission from the Sudanese affairs section at the ministry to allow the diplomats to enter Egypt; yet, the responsible officials would not allow it and demanded that the two diplomats resume their journey to Khartoum.

In Khartoum, AL-HAYAH learned that General al-Bashir has conducted telephone discussions on the latest developments in the Hala'ib crisis with each of the following dignitaries: King Hassan II of Morocco, King Husayn of Jordan, President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, the Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and the Yemeni president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.

The telephone communications also dealt with Sudan's relations with each of these countries.

The Sudanese president's aides said that yesterday's discussions with King Hassan included ways to deal with Arab differences, bring about Arab unity, and develop bilateral relations.

The Sudanese interior minister read a declaration yesterday to the transitory national council (parliament) informing it that two Egyptian infantry and special forces brigades had arrived at al-Shalatin and Abu-Ramad regions and that their commanders had ordered the Sudanese forces—composed of one battalion—to vacate the two regions. He declared that this event was the cause of the latest Hala'ib crisis.

The Minister threatened that his country would reconsider bilateral agreements, adding: "Egypt wants Sudan to become an Egyptian dependency." However, he said that Egypt had lifted the siege on the Sudanese police stations in Hala'ib, which Khartoum said Egyptian forces had besieged. He described conditions yesterday as "comparatively quiet." He said that "lifting the siege" had been a result of communications between the Egyptian and Sudanese military in the region.

In another move, Sudan has begun allowing the publication of independent daily newspapers, thus abolishing the government monopoly of newspaper publication. AL-HAYAH learned day before yesterday that Lieutenant General al-Bashir passed a decree abolishing orders to establish the three government publishing houses of al-Islam House for Journalism and Publication, the Cultural House and the Sudan House [names as published]. The same decree ordered that the three publishing houses be turned into corporations that

would follow corporate law. Possessions of the three houses will be turned over to the government which will own 40 percent of the stocks that are to be established.

Ummah Party Secretary Discusses Current Events
93AF0577A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
9 Apr 93 p 6

[Interview with Ummah Party Secretary Dr. 'Umar Nur-al-Da'im by Muhammad al-Hasan Ahmad and 'Uthman Mirghani in London; date not given: "I Did Not, as Rumored, Leave Khartoum on Conditions"; first paragraph is AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction]

[Text] In his first comprehensive political interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT after leaving Sudan, Ummah Party Secretary Dr. 'Umar Nur-al-Da'im discussed pressing political issues, the Sudanese Government's positions on these issues, and the opposition forces' view and role in confronting the regime. The following is the text of the interview.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] How did the government allow you to leave Sudan? What promises were you obliged to make? The government says that you left for medical treatment but chose to join the opposition. Al-Bashir personally launched an attack on al-Mirghani, you, and your colleague Mubarak al-Mahdi and described all of you as having sold Halayib to the Egyptians and betraying the country. What is your reply to all these questions and accusations?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] I left my second detention under this regime in May 1991, after being detained in a ghost house with a group of brothers. I remember that they included Salah 'Abd-al-Salam (minister of presidential affairs during the democratic regime), Khalid Muhammad Ibrahim (secretary of the Organization for Ansar Affairs), Hashim Muhammad Ahmad (head of the Engineers' Union), and the southern leaders (Samuel Aru) and (Alyaba Surur). My detention lasted four and one-half months. All of us slept on the ground while in detention. I suffered ulcerations on the chest and a recurrence of chronic kidney disease because of the bad conditions. On testimony from the medical commission, I applied officially to go abroad for treatment. It was 16 months before I was given an exit visa. I met no political or security official of the regime concerning the exit visa, for people to think I left on definite conditions. There is no basis in truth to the report the regime is spreading that I left on definite conditions or with specific commitments. Indeed, at the moment I left Sudan from Khartoum airport, I was intensely angry at the regime because at the last minute it forbade one of my sons from traveling with us, although all his papers were complete.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Did you sign any promise to the government concerning your trip?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] Indeed! How would it be conceivable for me as general secretary of the Sudan's majority party to promise anything that would prevent my carrying out

my political duties abroad, where opportunities are available to intensify political activity for the purpose of reaching a solution to our country's problems? Does the National [Islamic] Front (NIF) Party's having carried out a military coup mean that the political forces in Sudan must abandon their responsibilities and accept NIF tutelage over Sudan?

Lieutenant General al-Bashir's personal attack on us shows how politically backward Sudan's ruling group is. Lt. Gen. al-Bashir should realize that the political map of Sudan has not changed. All that happened is that the NIF party carried out a coup one of whose most conspicuous results has been a tremendous shrinking of the party's support due to four years of misbehavior by al-Bashir's government.

Will Return to Sudan, 'Buying' and 'Selling' Are Unseemly Terms

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Will you return to Sudan?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] Yes, and I see no objection to returning to Sudan at any moment. However, as a Sudanese citizen, all my political rights should be guaranteed. One of the misfortunes of military dictatorship is that it thinks that it is right under all circumstances and that human rights are a gift from an individual or the ruling party. This is the disaster and sterility of this regime. It should have realized that the time for autocracy and intimidation is past.

I will not neglect to comment on the words of the chairman of the Council of Salvation, that al-Mirghani, Mubarak al-Mahdi, and myself sold Halayib. I say that such language about 'selling' is unseemly in political dealings. It shows that the chairman of the council is receiving advice from incompetent guides whose understanding is not up to the required political level, but is at a low level that does not go beyond the concepts of selling and buying.

I personally have observed a series of contradictory and inconsistent statements by Lt. Gen. al-Bashir on the Halayib question over a period of only two months. He said in the beginning that Sudan, as an Islamic country, saw no value from the Islamic perspective to borders between Islamic countries; talk about Halayib therefore had no value and meaning.

He also emphasized that it would be impossible for Sudanese to take up arms against their Egyptian brothers over the matter. Then he retreated from these slogans to accuse us of selling Halayib, and he appealed to the NIF's slogans of jihad and martyrdom for what they termed a single inch of land.

Ummah Party Contemplates Unity With Egypt

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im—continuing to analyze the Halayib question] What happened in 1958, two years after Sudanese independence, concerning Halayib was nationalist thinking limited by the point of view of that time.

Now, however, when we are on the verge of the end of the 20th century, the world map has changed. The language of modern times speaks of unity and integration.

We in the Ummah Party think with the mentality of the 21st century. Such thinking must lift us from the levels of problems of borders and relations with Egypt and with neighbors in general to the path that leads to closer ties that lead to the unity that has become the age's watchword and its most important demand.

We look now toward formulating a strategic plan to resolve these important issues for the future between us and our brothers—first those in Egypt, and then such important neighbors as our brother countries Saudi Arabia, Libya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. We would establish formulas for integration and unity to face the demands of the next century.

If we look at Cairo now with this kind of up-to-date thinking, we find that it is really the second-largest Sudanese city. There are 3 million Sudanese there. They are treated exactly like Egyptians. This massive presence of Sudanese there is itself enough to invalidate the NIF's campaign of escalation against Egypt. This is certainly the case when the reasons for the escalation are basically unrelated to the interests of the Sudanese and the Egyptians, but relate only to the interests of others who have recently come into the area.

Does Opposition Advocate International Intervention?

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Does the opposition call for international intervention in Sudanese affairs? Was your recent visit to the United States aimed at hastening such intervention?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] The ruling regime in Sudan is suffering from a pathological state. One of its conspicuous symptoms is a kind of schizophrenia that leads to affirming something and its opposite at the same time.

At the very time they accuse us of calling for foreign intervention, Minister 'Ali al-Hajj is asking the American ambassador in Khartoum to bring about peace and security in the south and help implement federalism on the basis of the ideal experience of the United States of America. The regime also has accepted an invitation to attend an American congressional hearing to discuss the Sudanese regime's human rights violations to reach the best method of deterrence. The American ambassador in Khartoum visits the south without asking permission of the regime and visits areas not under government control. From the south he goes to Nairobi and holds a press conference in which he criticizes the regime and calls for international intervention, and the regime does not dare to deliver a reprimand. Indeed, Minister 'Ali al-Hajj begs the American ambassador for more intervention under the labels of expertise, aid, relief, and intervention to bring about peace.

Furthermore, the regime announces to the public that it supports international intervention in Somalia for humanitarian reasons. After this, does it have the right to allow itself to object to intervention in the Sudanese south for humanitarian reasons?

The regime certainly is suffering from a pathological state that manifests itself clearly in loss of balance and responsibility. Surely, nothing in the trip of an Ummah Party delegation to the United States should evoke astonishment or condemnation. The United States, by all standards, now is one of the world's strongest sources of political and economic stability. All who work in the political field therefore are striving to come to an understanding with the United States. So there is nothing strange in a trip to the United States by 'Umar Nur-al-Da'im and Mubarak al-Mahdi, who represent Sudan's biggest political party, with its public and parliamentary base. What is strange is that Dr. 'Ali al-Hajj and 'Abdal-Wahhab al-Afandi should visit the United States. The former lost in an election district in the city of Nyala in the west of Sudan; the second is an utterly unknown figure on the Sudanese political map who recently became Sudan's official spokesman in Britain. By these standards, it is incumbent on us, the popular parties with mass support, to make contact with circles in the world's center of stability, so as to end the isolation that the NIF has forced on Sudan and work to correct faulty conditions.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Lt. Gen. al-Bashir said that since Garang refused to meet al-Sadiq in his capacity of prime minister, but met him in his capacity as leader of the Ummah Party, one might describe al-Sadiq as "the defeated leader." Al-Sadiq, he said, along with al-Mirghani, signed a so-called peace agreement that was really a surrender agreement. What is your opinion of what is now happening and of what the government is saying about the actions to bring about peace?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] If such claptrap and superficial slogans deserve comment, one may say that al-Sadiq met with Garang and that al-Mirghani signed the peace agreement. As for al-Bashir, he still has not met with Garang. He tried to meet him twice in Nairobi and failed.

Therefore, even by this superficial standard, can the regime talk? In general, al-Sadiq would not have been able to become head of the government if he had not been head of the Ummah Party. The Ummah Party leadership does not diminish al-Sadiq's standing or lessen the capacity in which he met with Garang. Rather, it is the more lasting capacity. As for the peace agreement that al-Mirghani signed with Garang, the regime is now eager by all means to reach agreement with Garang in any form from a feeling that such an agreement might guarantee it a few posts in the governance of the north after turning over the south to Garang, thus bypassing the bloodlettings and divisions to which it has subjected Sudan, and particularly the people of the south.

Al-Sadiq and al-Mirghani, who enjoy the support of the majority of the people of Sudan—more than 70 percent of their votes—have no need for the NIF to recognize their standing. The regime should lift the emergency law and the curfew in order to learn what its place is on the map of the people of Sudan or whether its government will last.

Fate of Peace

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im, continuing] Peace is surely coming, because the international and regional conditions that observe civil wars on the continent and contemplate the condition reached by countries whose peoples have been crushed by wars realize that it is a duty to stop these wars. They realize that the way to this is by stability and that the most important pillar of stability is the trend toward pluralistic democracy after the end of the totalitarian dictatorships whose four decades of rule led the continent to its complete destruction. Nations gained nothing from military rule except drought, desertification, AIDS, crippling debt, and a declining standard of living that left only hunger, sickness, and misery.

The NIF thinks about peace outside the framework of these ideas. Thus it reflects a backward understanding of the characteristics of the age. Or it thinks that it alone will rule the north, while Garang's movement alone rules the south. In the end, the NIF does not oppose the secession of the south from the north. This is what was agreed in Frankfurt between 'Ali al-Hajj and Lam Akol. We, however, think the solution should be comprehensive and result from a constitutional convention where all of Sudan's pending issues are discussed with the participation of all Sudanese. The first stage of this solution begins with the liberation of the Sudanese people, north and south, from the internal colonialism that the "Salvation" military coup imposed.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Exactly what does the Ummah Party think about the coming Abuja round of peace talks?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] The Ummah Party has proposed the plan for a just peace advanced by brother al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to all political forces, the Sudanese Government, friendly and fraternal governments, African and Arab unity organizations, the United Nations, the Islamic Conference Organization, and prominent personalities such as President Carter and former British Prime Minister Edward Heath. There is no need to expatiate on the plan's dimensions and detailed provisions, as it is well-known and has been proposed to all political forces. One may sum up the gist of it very briefly in the following points:

- Sudan will be a democratic country. There will be a charter of human rights that guarantees the country's unity and accords with international charters.
- Legislation for all groups will be democratic and will not violate the agreed-on form of government.
- The government will be based on pluralism and just distribution of resources.

- There will be a transition period to deal with effects of the war. Reforms will be made in important areas of political parties, the military, the trade unions, the press, the judiciary, and the civil service in order to strengthen institutions to face the coming period.

Economic, Financial Situation

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] As the last minister of finance and economy in the period of democracy, naturally you could compare yesterday's and today's economic conditions for us.

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] I say forthwith that the regime has almost completed four years in office. All its policies in this regard have led to complete collapse of vital facilities in Sudan. I shall content myself in this sketch with citing the following two brief examples:

First, inflation has become so extreme as to threaten social peace in the country. The dollar exchange rate jumped from 16 Sudanese pounds on 30 June 1989, to 200 pounds at present. One should recall that Lt. Gen. al-Bashir and Salah Karrar used to say that but for the Salvation Revolution the dollar exchange rate would have reached 30 pounds. What do they have to say about this frightening, reprehensible fact?

Second, a gallon of gasoline used to cost less than 3 pounds. Now it has jumped to 150 pounds. Remember that gasoline is a major element in agriculture, industry, and transportation. Development activity has been completely paralyzed by this frightening increase; indeed, it has stopped. In plain words, everything has collapsed.

Because of this terrifying collapse, fundamental economic decisions now issue from the regime every week. Budgeting for the year has gone by the board. Movement takes place from week to week, sometimes even from day to day. The budget has come to consist of contributions that the chairman of the Revolutionary Council distributes during his visits to the regions. What a behind-the-times way of managing public finances!

I praise the regime for admitting recently that it has brought the Sudanese people hunger, but it has also alleged to them that it has brought them dignity and self-respect by independent decisionmaking.

In reality, it has spread fear, terror, and oppression and has ruled the country with iron, fire, and curfew.

Certainly, if normal life returns to Sudan, the NIF will have no position among the Sudanese. The NIF has experienced elections previously and has learned its position in them. It will not receive even a small part of that position after its follies against democracy and elections.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] The government talks about the corruption that existed during the democratic period. What is your reply?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] Doesn't everyone agree with me that the summit of NIF corruption lies in the dismissal of tens of thousands of Sudanese from posts in the military and civil service, either on the pretext of securing the revolution or to appoint loyalists instead of talented individuals? Wouldn't that be deemed the summit of corruption in a democratic regime?

Doesn't it constitute corruption when the finance minister announces on television that the state has waived 1.4 billion pounds in debts of the Sudanese Agricultural Bank, without stating whose debts were waived or how the money was spent or explaining to the people why the waivers were given.

Civilized, Reactionary Faces of Islam

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What specifically is the civilized face that the government has presented as an alternative to the face that the Ummah Party represented?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] This group certainly has no Islamic project. It has only slogans harmful to the country. God, who is blessed and exalted, says (Koran 16:90): "Surely God bids to justice and doing good." However, the practices of the NIF regime from inception to the present have proved that the NIF is far distant from the main principles of Islam. Of course it is well-known that the regime at first hid its NIF identity until the beginning of 1991. Afterward, it unleashed Islamic slogans in a way that was partisan, coercive, and authoritarian outside the framework of mutual consultation and advice among Muslims. This partisan NIF project is objectionable, because Islamic activity in Sudan was and still rests on broad bases under the umbrella of complete freedom, tolerance, wisdom, and good advice. It is a project that respects the conditions of the age, rules, and coexistence with other religious communities. It is a project that enjoys the respect of the majority of Sudanese. By this concept, the Islamic forces with measurable weight, along with the other religious communities, should propose formulas that enable each group to satisfy its legitimate religious aspirations.

We in the Ummah Party are proud of brother al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's Islamic efforts to treat issues of finance, development, Islamic legislation, and peaceful coexistence under the new world order. They are contributions we hope will find application. Islamic action certainly requires much patience, seriousness, and distance from fatuousness and slogans empty of any content.

Democracy, Vicious Cycle of Coups

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] It is with a good deal of dismay that people view Sudan's experience, which has revolved between democracy and militarism, causing Sudan to turn in a vicious circle. Do you have any plans to correct this state of affairs and make democracy surmount previous mistakes?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] Yes, there are some who talk about the chaos in the democratic period and the vicious circle. Such talk was particularly frequent after the NIF's coup against democracy and came mostly from the NIF's cadres. One should bear in mind that the NIF party benefited from democracy and all the gains of the April Revolution. Nevertheless, it invented the chaos in order to hide the urge to violence, terrorism, and attacking democracy. We do not deny that there was some lack of control in political parties, the media, the unions, and the military. At the same time, serious attempts were being made to remedy it, and people were aware of this in light of the democracy they were practicing. The real chaos is now. It lies in the governance of the country now by presidential orders that have suppressed all the basic freedoms of the Sudanese people. Citizens now are imprisoned, fired, banished, insulted, and humiliated by unknown agencies and persons. These orders permit uncontrolled torture and killing. This is chaos.

As for talk about a vicious cycle of democracy and military rule, I do not agree with the idea. The truth is that the pattern of governance under the defunct international order did not allow the democratic regime in Sudan to develop. Cold war calculations forced dictatorships on the great majority of African and Third World nations. Now, thank God, the foundations of the totalitarian regimes have been destroyed with the fall of the Berlin wall. The road has been smoothed and the way is clear for the Sudanese people to practice freedom and democracy after the disappearance of this hateful dictatorship. This democratic practice will be firmly rooted and a model for the countries of Africa, God willing. Truly, the Sudanese people have had great achievements throughout history. One need only mention how in the last century they challenged the world order of that time and established the Mahdist state despite England and France. In this century, they overthrew two military dictatorships: first in 1964, and then in 1985. With this fund of experience, the Sudanese people can present all the countries of the African continent with an ideal model for building democracy.

Foreign Relations: al-Sadiq to al-Bashir

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] In his first coup communiqué, al-Bashir said that they had come to reconstruct foreign policy, which the government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had undermined. As general secretary of the Ummah Party, would you compare for us Sudanese foreign relations under the two administrations—that of al-Sadiq and that of al-Bashir?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] There is absolutely no room for comparison. I need cite only two examples of Sudan's condition under the democratic regime. I was minister of finance when the Sudanese capital suffered disastrous rains and floods in August 1988. A World Bank delegation came to assess the damages, which were estimated at \$406 million. In November of the same year, the donor nations held a meeting in Paris and offered the entire sum in one session. Participants included Japan, the

United States, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, the Scandinavian countries, England, France, Canada, and Italy. In March 1989, Mr. Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the finance minister of Saudi Arabia, called on all Arab funds to make a settlement of Sudan's debts and promote development in the country. The meeting was successful by all standards. Thus, the democratic regime enjoyed immeasurable international respect. Every year we attracted between \$2.5 billion and \$3 billion in grants, loans, and aid to the country from the international family. I think there is no comparison with the complete and crippling isolation that this regime is experiencing on the Arab, Islamic, and world scene, as well as the condemnations it has received because of its human rights violations and its outcast status in the Arab world because it supported and backed Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

I want to thank AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AL-DUWALIYAH on this occasion for taking an interest in the other view, for giving an opportunity to Sudanese of all outlooks to express opinion, for maintaining its neutrality, and for not yielding to the pressures that the regime has exerted. These pressures have gone as far as closing the offices of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT and arresting its reporters in Khartoum. I also thank the entire Arab press and brother Sudanese journalists for following what is happening in our country. We hope that the cloud of dictatorship will dissipate and freedom return, so that publication and creativity will return to Sudan after the cloud of intellectual aridity brought by the NIF party dictatorship disappears.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] How do you, as secretary of the Ummah Party, explain al-Sadiq's arrest and release?

[Dr. Nur-al-Da'im] Al-Sadiq's arrest was an act that indicated foolishness and nervousness. Al-Sadiq is a symbol of the legitimacy that the ruling government violated. Understood in this way, this government is the archenemy of the democracy that has become the hallmark of the age. Thus, any revenge the government takes against brother al-Sadiq is a continuation of the regime's outrages against democracy.

That is why the world is concerned about al-Sadiq's life and about the course of the pluralistic democracy that the world desires and to which the people of Sudan aspire. The NIF continues to lag behind the characteristics of the age. It still has not understood that its coup took place at the wrong time. The whole world has transcended dictatorships and all their dictatorial namesakes; it has turned indisputably to the multiparty democracy that the NIF has destroyed in Sudan. The world now demands its restoration.

The NIF has turned its back on the two most important events in modern Sudanese history: the October 1964 revolution, and the April 1985 uprising. It has deleted the two occasions from the celebrations of the Sudanese people and canceled the vacations given for them. Thus it turns its back on the most prominent milestones in the

struggle of the Sudanese people. It fears that popular uprisings will repeat themselves to overthrow its dictatorial rule. Thus it was not strange that its arrest of al-Sadiq coincided with the anniversary of the April uprising. The memory of such an event frightens the NIF and gives it sleepless nights.

Rebel Leader Details Nubian State's Necessity

93AF0573A London *AL-HAYAH* in Arabic 13 May 93
p 7

[Interview with the general commander of the Popular Army for the Liberation of Sudan, Yusuf Kuwah by Nizar Daw al-Na'im in Abuja; date not given: "Rebel Leader Details Nubian State's Necessity"]

[Text] Yusuf Kuwah is the commander of the "Popular Army for the Liberation of Sudan" in the Nuba Mountains. He is also vice-president of this army's delegation to the second round of the Sudanese peace negotiations. In his first press interview since 1983, commander Kuwah told AL-HAYAH that the Nubian tribes to which he belongs "have been exposed since independence to a continuous dissolution operation from the ruling regime in Khartoum." He made it clear that it was for certain historic, economic, and social reasons that the Nubians had an inferiority complex and regarded themselves as second class citizens. He indicated that he had resorted to armed struggle because non-Arab ethnic groups and minorities in Sudan had achieved no gains through political means.

Yusuf Kuwah indicated that the regime in Khartoum had set many villages on fire and killed 6,000 Nubian civilians during a campaign to isolate his forces. He also called for a united Sudan in which the various ethnic groups could maintain their identity in order to preserve their culture and society and stop the dissolution operation which the Arab element in Sudan is charged with implementing. He added that his ethnic group is demanding the establishment of a separate state in the Nuba Mountains region. AL-HAYAH conducted the following interview with Kuwah in the Nigerian capital Abuja:

[Al-Na'im] Why did you rebel against the regime; and what were your demands?

[Kuwah] I learned from the media that there was a personal reason for my rebellion, specifically because of disagreements about a certain job. My rebellion against the regime began when I started school. In my view, the regime has remained the same, in spite of changes in names and faces. The reason for my rebellion is the injustice that my kinsfolk (the Nubian tribes in western Sudan) face, particularly their treatment as second class citizens. This is due to both the historic circumstances related to the slave trade and to economics because of the kind of jobs we have. It is also related to a social factor, the way the Northerners degrade us. For all these

reasons, we have an inferiority complex and feel like strangers in our own land because the Arab ethnic groups scorn us.

Though this feeling has an impact on one's personality, one may not feel it on a daily basis. Yet, some incidents that a person may encounter, possibly due to normal reasons and from ordinary people, may arouse this feeling. One event that disturbed me a lot occurred following the Sudanese October 1964 revolution, during a debate in Sudan about women's political rights. I was a high school student when one of my teachers put this issue up for debate. Each student responded with his view. At the end of the debate, we asked the teacher about his view. The teacher belonged to an Arab ethnic group. He responded with scorn, saying: "Why should women acquire any political rights as long as they cannot manage their homes properly. In fact, had it not been for the help of Nubians, homes would not have been managed." As soon as I heard this view, I rebelled and realized that women's issues had precedence over that of the Nubians. Since that time, I have become politically active.

Until 1983, we preferred to conduct our political activity within the framework of existing institutions. We established parties to represent us; yet, we were accused of ethnicity because our political parties were based on our Nubian ethnicity. We were also faced with the cultural dissolution problem, because Northerners wanted us to believe that as long as we were Muslims and had Arabic as a native tongue, we were considered Arabs. Northerners also refused to hear any argument concerning an ethnic group that had its own cultural traits. They even considered any reference to ethnicity as a call for racism. All of this made futile our political activity and almost impossible the probability of any ethnic gains. In addition, we noticed that the southern Sudanese achieved many gains from the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement because they were armed. Therefore, I resorted to this strategy after despairing of the current regime; and also because large segments of my kinsfolk accepted my appeal.

[Al-Na'im] Why did you choose joining the "Popular Army" which is led by John Garang and is a southern movement with a defined problem?

[Kuwah] First: Both of us were unfairly treated. Second: The Popular Army's main call is to recognize the cultural and ethnic diversity in Sudan and establish a new regime based on this diversity, as opposed to a call for ethnic groups to give up their rights. The Popular Movement is not southern. Its goal is not to solve the problem of the South only but to liberate all the country and establish a secular regime within a united Sudan. Moreover, when the idea of establishing a confederation was proposed, it defined the South to include all adjoining regions, not the South according to its existing definition. Besides, we respond very well to the Movement's slogans of justice and equality.

[Al-Na'im] Are you in alliance with or just a member of the Popular Movement?

[Kuwah] No, it is not an alliance, because an alliance should be between two parties. Rather, from the beginning, we responded to the Movement's national appeal.

[Al-Na'im] What are your exact demands? Have your demands undergone any changes during the last ten years?

[Kuwah] Our demands are still comprehensive national demands. Moreover, we want to draw world attention to the dissolution operation that non-Arab ethnic groups in Sudan are facing. This operation aims at obliterating both cultural and material traits. The distortion of civilization to which we have been exposed has led to the loss of our self-esteem and to our feeling of inferiority. We demand that the balance be restored and that we have our share of the authority. We also demand to be respectfully and fairly treated. Unless our demands are granted, we will continue to bear arms until our death.

[Al-Na'im] What have you achieved so far?

[Kuwah] Our first achievement has been to restore our identity and to halt its continuous dissolution. Besides, the mere fact of being armed has stopped the continuous drain of educated Nubians who, until the eighties, were denying their affiliation to the Nubian tribes.

[Al-Na'im] What do you hope to achieve from the current Sudanese peace negotiations going on in Nigeria?

[Kuwah] We joined the "Popular Movement" which calls for a united Sudan. We still believe that the ideal solution is to establish a united Sudan with a federal system that gives the states real authority and respects the diversification that exists in the country. We also want our region to be a separate state because it has its own identity.

However, matters may change considerably because of the government's stand and its determination to impose "Islamic law." At this point, let me state that we feel much pain because of the split that has happened in the Popular Movement. I am not defending Garang; yet, I am certain that he was sincere when he called for unity of the country. However, the split that happened in the Movement made it imperative for him to talk about a confederation because those who split put him in an awkward position when they called for the separation of the South. Added to this is Khartoum's obstinacy. The result is that we were left with two options: Khartoum's option, which calls for an Islamic state, and that of the Al-Nasir group, which calls for separation. The confederation was therefore the suitable compromise.

[Al-Na'im] There were reports of massacres during the latest battles with the government forces?

[Kuwah] We confronted the army during this last period. I would like to indicate that the government of Lieutenant General 'Umar al-Bashir declared a cease-fire in

the South for six months. However, battles in the Nuba Mountains have never stopped since the present regime came to power. Lieutenant General al-Bashir believes that the rebellion in western Sudan should be crushed and not allowed to extend to the North. Since splits occurred among the southern rebels the government concentrated its activities in the Nuba Mountains, staging continuous assaults, while it left Southerners to fight amongst themselves as a result of their split. More than once, Lieutenant General al-Bashir declared that he had crushed the rebellion in the Nuba Mountains. Yet, this is not true.

In 1992, Khartoum changed its policy and started destroying whole villages, along with its civilians, in regions that belong to us. This was done in an effort to cut our supply lines, especially since we get our supplies from people living in these regions. For this reason, we increased our forces, confronted these assaults, and seized supplies and ammunition.

I would also like to indicate that we killed some Iranians in these battles and seized Iranian arms. The government may strongly deny these facts, yet, they are true.

[Al-Na'im] Yet, so far you have not provided any proof of this claim? Do you have any proof?

[Kuwah] We will prove what we claim at the appropriate time.

[Al-Na'im] What about the annihilation incidents that you mentioned?

[Kuwah] The government changed its strategy and resorted to a plan that aims at making us starve and isolating us from the rest of our civilian folk. The government also drove civilians into leaving the region by burning farms and villages and arranging mass deportation operations. Because we depended on the region for our living, these operations affected us, resulting in the surrender of some Nubian groups. However, all these events have not achieved the government's goal, because we are still thriving and still have effective forces.

Since mid-year, the government has killed more than 6,000 innocent civilians.

[Al-Na'im] You are accused of leading the battle in your land, in which case the residents of your region would be the losers and not the regime?

[Kuwah] What is the alternative? What do my people possess that they would lose? War is destruction. We have to fight to achieve our goals. Should I surrender? Or should I lead my battles in a strange land, far from my supply line?

[Al-Na'im] What happened after the split of al-Nasir group that has cut your supply lines?

[Kuwah] Supplies have been cut for some time, yet, we are now able to meet our needs at intervals.

[Al-Na'im] Does that mean that you are currently conducting a local war and leading an isolated group?

[Kuwah] No. We can still get our supplies but between longer intervals. However, it is certain that al-Nasir group's split damaged our cause; otherwise, we would have been in a totally different situation.

[Al-Na'im] Many Nubians are not in agreement with the method of bearing arms which you follow.

[Kuwah] My response to them would be: What gains did you get for your ethnic group by working with the Arab ruling institution in Sudan? I would continue to inform them that the regime negotiates only with those who carry arms.

[Al-Na'im] Khartoum accuses you of having contributed to the spread of Christian missionary work in the region though you are a Muslim. How would you defend yourself?

[Kuwah] They forgot that it was they who turned the struggle into a religious one by calling for a "jihad" against us. We have no religious problem in the region simply because the Christian, the Muslim, and the atheist are one family. I would like to emphasize that it was the government that resorted to the use of religion in the struggle.

[Al-Na'im] How much is the world aware of your region's problem?

[Kuwah] It is very recently that the world has shown any concern for us. Besides, this concern has so far not gone beyond that of the media, with the result that we have received neither subsidy nor assistance. Nine months ago, officials of the United Nations relief agency promised to visit our region to assess the situation, but this visit has not yet taken place. I appeal to the international community to come and review our citizens' conditions and give them assistance. One of our problems is that, in order for any aid to reach us, it has to pass through land that is under the government's control. Conditions in our region are not similar to those in the South where aid can reach it directly via either Kenya or Uganda. We therefore appeal to the international community to put pressure on Khartoum to allow the passage of relief supplies to our region.

TUNISIA

Research Paper Covers Background, Funding of Islamists

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25 Mar, 15 Apr 93*

[Two-part series by Moncef Mahroug on research paper by Alaya Allani]

[25 Mar pp 12-13]

[Text] A thesis by Alaya Allani offers insight into previously little-known aspects of relations between the government and the Islamists since their emergence in the early 1970's.

More than other movements, the Islamist movements are shrouded in secrecy. Knowledge of their internal structure and workings and their dealings with their immediate and more distant surroundings is very difficult to come by. The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), now known as Ennahdha, is no exception to the rule.

It is only in the past year or two that the secrets of the 20-year-old Islamic Tendency Movement have begun to come to light. A new and important contribution to the effort to penetrate the movement's veil of secrecy is a thesis by Alaya Allani, a history teacher and member of the Political Bureau of the MDS [Movement of Socialist Democrats]. The young researcher successfully defended his thesis before a board of examiners who recognized the ground-breaking nature of his work. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of that work consists of interviews he was able to obtain with individuals who have played important roles in the movement's leadership, among them H'mida Ennaifar, Slaheddine Jourchi, Nejib Ayari, Abdelkader Jedidi, and Hassen Ghodhbani. Their testimonies dispel part of the mystery that has enveloped the organization and the workings of the Islamist machine.

When the MTI was created in the early 1970's, as readers will remember, it had the tacit approval of the government, which, at that time, was preoccupied with blocking the Left. In April 1972, after being expelled from the Association for the Preservation of the Koran, Rached Ghannouchi and his friends founded the "Jamaa Islamiya," which was able to establish numerous "circles" in mosques and high schools without triggering any fear or hostility inside the government. In fact, the government did more than just look the other way; it encouraged the group's activity, the author of the thesis states, based on his interviews. That explains why the Islamists held meetings with Destourian students following the Korba coup attempt in 1971. The Islamists agreed to these meetings because they believed that "the greatest threat to the country came from the Communists and that the regime was doomed to fall," Nejib Ayari told the author.

At a higher level, indirect contacts took place into the early 1980's. The purpose of these contacts was to reassure the government concerning the Islamists' intentions. The lawyer Hassan Ghodhbani, a former figure in the MTI, met with Mohamed Sayah on three different occasions during the second half of the 1970's; he also met once with the late Hedi Nouira in 1980. According to Hassan Ghodhbani, Ghannouchi was aware of these contacts. It was Mohamed Sayah, then director of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], who initiated the meetings with Ghodhbani. Mohamed Sayah, "as an

official of the party apparatus, took an interest in the spread of the Islamist phenomenon, which he perceived as a threat to his party. For Hedi Nouira, on the other hand, religion was solely a spiritual matter."

The government's attitude toward the Islamist movement changed radically when it learned of its true nature in late 1980. The government stumbled into that realization, completely by accident, on 5 December 1980, according to the accounts given by those who were interviewed by the author of the thesis. Among them is the account by Nejib Ayari who recounted that a police officer who lived in the Carthage Avenue apartment building that housed the offices of "Al Habib" (the official newspaper of the MTI then) was returning to his home at five o'clock that morning when he noticed unusual activity in the newspaper's offices. It struck him as odd that Salah Karkar and Benaissa Demni would be in the newspaper's offices so early in the morning and he therefore alerted his superiors. The police arrived and arrested the two MTI officials who had in their possession nearly 2,000 pages of important documents concerning the organization. "This was how the authorities learned that the MTI was a structured movement and was engaged in organized activity." In "The Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia" (a book that Alaya Allani views as an internal document of the movement because it has remained unpublished), the leader of the Islamist movement, Rached Ghannouchi, writes that the incident put into the hands of the government "a gold mine of information about the movement that it had not even thought possible."

This "catastrophe," as Rached Ghannouchi termed it, would eventually force the MTI to announce that it would seek legal status and conduct legal political activity. In his book, Ghannouchi writes that the MTI had a great deal of difficulty in convincing the membership that this was the right course to take. It drew resistance from "a large segment of the membership, particularly among university students." Abdelfattah Mourou reveals that he was the only MTI leader to advocate legalization prior to the authorities' discovery of the movement's documents. His revelation confirms that the decision to seek legal status was a tactical one.

On 6 June 1981, the movement applied for authorization to form a political party and held its first press conference that same day. But these steps did not halt the process that had been set in motion with the arrests of 5 December 1980, a process that would lead to the first large-scale trial of Islamists in September 1981.

Following the convictions of MTI leaders, it would take another two years before [relations] resumed between the government and the MTI in 1983 on the initiative of Slaheddine Jourchi who urged the movement's leadership to take the preliminary step of publishing a statement clearly denouncing recourse to violence and denying any claim to hold a "monopoly on Islamic identity." The statement was published in June 1983 on the second anniversary of the movement's founding.

Hamouda Ben Slama and Mezri Chekir, then minister of the civil service, would later join the mediation efforts. In addition to those efforts, according to Abdelfattah Mourou, the government became the object of external appeals and pressure to free the movement's leadership. The appeals and the pressure came from Saudi Arabia and from Taoufik Chaoui of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood who was residing in Saudi Arabia and who made a direct appeal to Bourguiba and then Prime Minister Mzali.

Jourchi and Ben Slama drew up a three-part scenario: First, Abdelfattah Mourou would be released and placed under house arrest; second, a meeting between Mourou and Mzali would be arranged; and third, Mourou would send a letter to Bourguiba that would pave the way for the amnesty later to be granted to other MTI leaders. The letter was sent on 4 July 1984 and the release took place a short while later.

It was then that a normalization process began and it would culminate in November 1985 with an official meeting between then Prime Minister Mzali, on the one hand, and Ghannouchi and Mourou, on the other, at Government House in the Casbah. Said Mohamed Sayah, "Mohamed Mzali did not consult us about the meeting. He consulted neither the Political Bureau nor the Cabinet." The same source says that after the meeting, Mohamed Mzali "told the Central Committee of his good impressions and he praised Rached Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou, saying: 'If only we had people like them in the party.'"

But it was not long before relations between the MTI and the government turned tense once again, the combined result of the government's refusal to grant the movement legal status and—the author of the thesis explains—the continuing rift between the movement's moderates and hard-liners. The MTI opted for confrontation following the seizure by the police of crucial documents on 6 July 1986. That decision was confirmed by the movement's fourth congress, which took place in El Manar in December 1986.

The year of confrontation was 1987, which reached its peak with the trial of the MTI leadership in September. Rached Ghannouchi was facing the death penalty, but several instances of mediation intervened, preventing such an outcome, which would have plunged the country into bloodbath. Among the attempts at mediation, Hassan Ghodhbani states that his own effort was undertaken "at the request of both sides."

The idea of mediating, says Hassan Ghodhbani, came out of a discussion with Slaheddine Jourchi. "We talked about the possibility mediating between the government and the movement. Chadli Klibi's name was mentioned as a possible mediator who would have some influence over Bourguiba, but we quickly abandoned that idea."

According to Hassan Ghodhbani, Rached Ghannouchi was all the more in favor of a mediation effort once he learned that Bourguiba was intent on executing him.

Ghodhbani adds that "it was at my urging that Ghannouchi refrained from attacking Bourguiba during the trial," going on to explain that "I had told him that if he attacked Bourguiba, he would inevitably be sentenced to death. We talked at length before I could convince him, and he asked me to include in my defense speech ideas that he wanted to convey to the government, particularly to those in government who would be able to sway Bourguiba."

Hassan Ghodhbani would later meet with a representative of the government for a discussion in which "the representative presented demands, among them that Ghannouchi write a letter declaring good will toward Bourguiba, that disturbances in Tunisia come to an end, and that the media campaign abroad be halted. The MTI responded favorably to these demands. The official then gave his assurance that it would be possible to attempt to persuade Bourguiba not to impose harsh sentences.

After contacts with Mourou in Saudi Arabia and Habib Mokni in France, these demands—with the exception of the letter—were rapidly met.

As a result, none of the MTI leaders under arrest was sentenced to death.

(To be continued next week)

[15 Apr pp 14-16]

[Text] How the MTI was financed is one of the most important revelations contained in Alaya Allani's thesis on the Islamists. Here is that story.

Between 1970 and 1972, the activity of the Jamaa Islamiya consisted in holding a "general circle" meeting every Friday evening at the Saheb Attabaa Mosque in Tunis and a religious conference at the headquarters of the Association for the Preservation of the Koran every Saturday evening. In those days, the Jamaa Islamiya had some 100 members divided into five or six cells called "special cells," which met in the mosques under the supervision of Salah Ben Abdallah, Rached Ghannouchi, and H'mida Ennaifar.

Created in 1970, Jamaa Islamiya changed in nature very rapidly. It took little more than two years for the turning point to come in the spring of 1972 when the future founding members of the Movement [Islamic Tendency Movement] met in Le Mornag for what resembled a constituent assembly, later dubbed "the meeting of the forty."

Despite its transformation, the now more political Movement did not desert the mosques. On the contrary, the mosques were confirmed in their role as the preferred sites of recruitment and training. The Movement's future members are initially placed into a "general circle" for religious induction. During that time, their behavior and their relations are scrutinized. Once the potential member passes this first test—although he will

never be informed that he has—he begins to move up in the hierarchy from the cell to “open families” and to “committed families.”

The members of the cell—who number between five and eight and who do not know that they are part of an organization and who are persuaded to believe in “a need for collective action and the importance of the call to God”—are supervised by a member of an “open family” whose task is to steep them in Islam. Because the cell phase is considered a test, cell members may spend one or two years in the cell or remain there indefinitely. They do not pay dues, but if they wish to contribute, the money goes to finance the activities of the mosque.

The “open family” has five members who are supervised by a member of a “committed family.” Unlike the cell member, the “open family” member is made vaguely aware of the fact that he belongs to an organization, although no details are provided. Membership in an “open family” may last from one to two years. The “open family” member knows only the local leaders. The monthly dues are 500 millimes for a high-school student, 1 dinar [DA] for a university student, and 5 DA for a civil servant. The “open family” members know that their dues go towards the organization. The “committed family” has five members who, for security reasons, are allowed to know their regional leaders but not the central leadership. Both types of “families” meet at least once a week.

Seven years elapsed between the “meeting of the forty” and the Movement’s true constituent assembly. The first congress of the Islamic Tendency Movement was held from 11 to 13 August 1979 at La Manouba. Sixty delegates, including 12 from the capital city, were selected from lists of proposed names to participate in the congress, which was held without the knowledge of the government. Hiding its true purpose, the congress was portrayed as a conference on Islamic thought organized by the magazine AL MAARIFA.

Three questions were put before the congress, for which preparations began in 1977: membership in the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood (which the MTI joined in 1976); the position to be taken with regard to the dissident H’mida Ennaifar and his group; and finally, approval of the Movement’s by-laws and the election of a new leadership.

The participants approved the Movement’s membership in the Muslim Brotherhood and a majority voted against H’mida Ennaifar. The congress approved by-laws that called for the six levels listed below starting with the highest level of hierarchy:

- the Congress, the Movement’s supreme body, which meets once every three years to determine general policy and to decide major issues;
- the Advisory Council (Majlis Esh Shura), a 14-member assembly elected by the Congress and meeting every three months. Its mission is to set guidelines for the Movement and to decide major questions as dictated by policy and by changes in the situation.

- the Executive Bureau, led by an Amir, elected by the Congress. Its task is to carry out the decisions and recommendations of the Advisory Council. It is made up of committees covering the various sectors of the Movement’s activities.
- the Governors, who are chosen by the Amir to lead each region with the task of promoting the Movement’s activity in the various sectors. They are assisted by the Movement’s Executive Bureau and its Advisory Council.
- the representatives. Each representative is responsible for a sector (sectors are subdivisions of regions).
- the cells that—from the “open family” to the “committed family”—form the framework for rank-and-file members.

The University and the high schools are treated as regions of their own because the students are spread out across the entire country.

The Movement barely had a structure when it launched a recruitment program focussed on the University and the high schools. In the summer of 1980, the Movement began to draw up a plan of “student activity” as it was named. Although the Movement had already become active in the high schools in the 1970’s, the organizing and training of high school students did not begin until 1976, and it was not until 1982-83 that a high-school students’ group was created in the Movement.

But first, the Movement changed its tactics in 1981. Coming after the accidental discovery of the Movement’s secret structure on 5 December 1980, President Bourguiba’s speech of 11 April 1980—in which he agreed to the idea of a multiparty system—would cause the Jamaa Islamiya to declare its interest in becoming a political party. Because the Movement had dissolved its internal structure in reaction to the seizure of 5 December 1980, a second congress had to be convened and that congress would have to fix blame for what had happened on 5 December 1980 and choose a new structure and activity. The Congress convened in Sousse in April 1981. Many of its participants urged that the Movement’s secret bodies be retained. That view prevailed and the publicly-known Executive Bureau was endowed with a secret counterpart.

The first major trial of the MTI’s leadership in August 1981 marked the beginning of what would be the first of the Movement’s wilderness years, which would last three years in all. After its leadership was released in August 1984, the Movement slowly began to regain its freedom of action. The Jamaa Al Islamiya, renamed the Islamic Tendency Movement by the congress in Sousse, seized the opportunity to hold its third congress, which had become a matter of urgency, given the divisiveness that had developed within the Movement between 1981 and 1984.

The MTI, in disarray after the trial, fell prey to infighting. Rached Ghannouchi himself says in his unpublished book *The Islamic Tendency Movement* that Salah Karkar and Salah Ben Abdallah doubted his ability to lead the Movement. Growing efforts to create allegiances had made him fear that the Movement would fragment. Ghannouchi quickly drafted a text, entitled "the right to differ and the duty to stand united," which was distributed to all of the Movement's imprisoned leaders. In it, he urged his comrades to give priority to the latter.

With the widening gap between Rached Ghannouchi and Salah Karkar and their respective followers, it was inevitable that the third congress be convened, and it was held in Soliman in 1984. It was an elective congress that was asked to decide the battle. The 70 delegates to the congress, which was presided by Ali Laaridh, elected Rached Ghannouchi as the Movement's president and Salah Karkar as speaker of the Majlis Esh Shura. The fourth congress, held two years later in December 1986, was also faced with the task of finding a balance between the moderate and hard-line factions. It was the fourth Congress that moved toward total confrontation with the government.

How does the MTI—now renamed An-Nahdha—finance its various activities? From the dues paid by its members? Alaya Allani found interesting answers to these questions in his interviews with MTI members. They are among the most important revelations of his thesis. We learn that the question of finances was always shrouded in the greatest secrecy, never discussed in detail in meetings of the Executive Bureau—only in one-on-one conversations with the president of the Movement. Moreover, to keep secret the Movement's sources of income, numbers were substituted for the names of donors starting in 1986.

Funding became a problem as of 1974-75, said Nejib Ayari. It was decided at that time that the members would pay dues in accordance with their rank in the hierarchy and they personal situations (high-school student, university student, and employee). A family member would pay 5 percent of his salary.

But member dues ("open" and "committed" families combined) and general revenues from the zakah [almsgiving] could not cover all of the Movement's expenses. The leadership decided to create other sources of income in the form of economic projects in Tunisia and abroad. Nejib Ayari, a former governor of Greater Tunis, recalls that the Movement acquired a restaurant in Paris in the late 1970's for the price of 50,000 DA. Because the members' monthly dues could not cover the transaction, the Movement's members and officials had to increase their contributions to half of their salaries and year-end bonus. According to the same source, the Movement's budget in 1979 was in excess of 500,000 DA, 250,000 of which went to the "center" and the rest to the regions.

Moreover, if we are to believe accounts by Nejib Ayari and Hassen Ghodhbani, the Movement also received a financial "supplement" of an unspecified amount from abroad. According to Nejib Ayari, the Muslim Brotherhood gave material support of various kinds to the MTI. In one instance, it purchased 1,000 copies of the magazine AL MAARIFA; in another, it supplied hundreds if not thousands of books free of charge to the Movement, which then sold them for profit. Hassan Ghodhbani says that among the Movement's leaders, he heard mention of support and funding from foreign countries—both Arab and non-Arab—and including Iran. In addition, Hassan Ghodhbani says that one day in the early 1970's Rached Ghannouchi informed him of a sum offered by an Arab donor.

IRAN

Officials Expected To Be Called at Terrorism Trial

*93WR0230A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
23 Apr 93 p 4*

[Text] Paris, London—The names of three Iranian ministers and at least one Iranian diplomat in a Western European country are expected to be mentioned as witnesses in the trial of an alleged terrorist group scheduled to begin in Paris shortly.

The judge assigned to the case, Jean Louis Bruguiere, issued an international arrest warrant for Hoseyn Sheykh Attar, a former senior official in the Iranian Communications Ministry.

Two Iranian diplomats are in jail in Paris on charges of belonging to said terrorist group. They are zayn al-'Abedin Sarhaddi-zan, who used to work in the Iranian embassy in Switzerland, and Masoud Hendizadeh, the son of Ayatollah Khomeyni's brother. Hendizadeh has cooperated "fully" with the French police since being arrested, and has helped them uncover other members in the organization.

Last year, the police released a suspect, Ms. Fereshteh Jahanbani, who has also agreed to testify in court.

'Ali Vakili-Rad, one of the three suspects, acknowledged killing former [Iranian] Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in an operation with Iranian intelligence. He agreed to disclose the identities of some of the people he had contacted in Tehran and the Iranian ambassadors in Switzerland and Germany. The French police are also hunting for two other suspects, Bahman Boyer-Ahmadi and Mohammad Azadi, because of their connection to Bakhtiar's murder.

The judge also issued arrest warrants for Naser Qasemi-Nejad and Gholam-Hoseyn Sharideh, both of whom are members of the Republican Guard.

Iranian assassination teams have killed 21 Iranian expatriates in Paris since 1979, including Prince Mostafa Shafiq, the son of the shah's sister; General Gholam Hoseyn Oveysi, the former commander of the ground forces; and Professor Cyrus Elahi, a former political science professor at Tehran University. According to French sources, President Rafsanjani has offered Paris personal guarantees that no other terrorist operations inspired by Iran will occur on French soil.

His representative, 'Ali-Reza Mo'ayeri, offered the guarantee to the former French socialist government during a visit to Paris last year.

It is since then that [Iranian] expatriates outside France have been murdered, especially in Switzerland, Austria, Germany, and Turkey.

According to analysts, the new French Government wants to handle the Bakhtiar case swiftly, with a view toward a quick improvement in relations with Iran.

Alleged Dispatch of Revolution Guard Units to Qom

*93AS0788B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 29 Apr 93
pp 1, 4*

[Article by Safa Ha'iri: "Special Units to Qom, Fear of Unrest"]

[Text] On 28 April, Iran renewed its attack on Arab-Israeli negotiations and on Egypt. The leader of the revolution, 'Ali Khamene'i, declared that any agreement signed by the Arab governments in the negotiations would be "invalid in the view of the Palestinian people, world Muslims, and Iran."

Meanwhile, sources close to the Iranian Government indicated that the authorities have decided to send to Qom, considered to be the "cradle of the Islamic Revolution, special units from the elite Iranian Revolution Guard, which were performing their duties on the Iraqi border." They would be concentrated there for the purpose of preventing disorder in the town, which is also considered the stronghold of the disaffected Ayatollah Hosayn 'Ali Montazeri.

The Tehran authorities have completely isolated Montazeri's headquarters and have suspended the study circles, in which his sermons and positions were presented under house arrest. This occurred after bloody clashes in Qom last month between his supporters and the forces of "law and order," as units from the Revolution Guard were called. Montazeri has accused the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, of working to eliminate the Shi'a structure, which is more than a century old and which relies on "consensus, consultation, and progression" in religious ranks. Khamene'i does this by resorting to an elective system that is partial to younger religious men.

These ideological and legal arguments have stirred up rancor among Iranian clerics, who number some 300,000, and have resulted in the arrest of 10,000 junior clerics and Islamic students, who support Montazeri's views. The Iranian newspaper SALAM, in its 27 April edition, reported that the authorities have shut down the pro-Montazeri newspaper MUJAHED, after accusing it of publishing reports about the mistreatment of old revolutionaries by men of the Revolution Guard and leaders of government-organized demonstrations.

General Mohsen Reza'i, the commander general of the Revolution Guard, has stated in the past that his men were charged with the task of maintaining security in the country, in accordance with orders issued by Khamene'i, in his capacity as supreme commander of the Iranian Armed Forces. Observers consider that "this action is a major change in the Iranian authorities' strategy, because forces that maintain law and order are the ones

responsible for the mission of watching over stabilization of security in the entire country."

Khamene'i

On the foreign political level, Khamene'i strongly attacked the Egyptian regime, commanding what he called "the struggle of the Islamic hardliners" against it. Turning to the Middle East peace talks that resumed in Washington on 27 April, Khamene'i called them "infamous negotiations" that anger the Arab people. He added: "Iran supports peace, but it opposes conducting negotiations in the name of peace, for the purpose of bestowing stability and legitimacy on a major oppressor."

Khamene'i asserted that, "No one has the right to sign an agreement on behalf of the Palestinian people and to sell Palestine. Any agreement that the Arab governments

may sign in connection with these negotiations would be invalid in the view of the Palestinian people, world Muslims, and Iran."

Iran is continuing its naval maneuvers in the Gulf, after advising its Arab neighbors that the purpose is purely defensive. The Islamic Republic News Agency quoted the naval commander, Admiral 'Ali Shamkhani, speaking at his base in the northern Gulf, as saying that foreign forces are showing "considerable and suspicious" military presence in the area, led by 84 American navy ships. He added that 36,000 Iranian Navy, Army, Air Force, and Revolution Guard personnel will join the maneuvers, in which ships, submarines, aircraft, missiles, and other equipment will participate.

Military experts stationed in the Gulf stated that the submarine that Iran purchased from Russia last year, is not deployed in the northern Gulf and will not participate in the maneuvers. They expressed the belief that Iran will use a number of midget submarines, which it was said to be building last year.